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To identify characteristics of 
beneficiaries of health care over which 
relative weights should be derived and 
to estimate relative weights to be 
attached to health gains according to 
characteristics of recipients of these 
gains (relativities study); and to assess the 
feasibility of estimating a willingness-to- 
pay (WTP)-based value of a quality-
adjusted life-year (QALY) (valuation 
study), two interview-based surveys 
were administered – one (for the 
relativities study) to  a nationally 
representative sample of the population in 
England and the other (for the valuation 
study) to a smaller convenience 
sample. The two surveys were 
administered by the National Centre 
for Social Research (NatCen) in 
respondents’ homes. Discrete choice 
results  showed that age and severity 








respondents’ choices over and above the health  
(QALY) gains presented. In contrast, matching 
showed age and severity impacts to be strong: 
depending on method of aggregation, gains to 
some groups were weighted  three to four times 
more highly than gains to others. Results from the 
WTP and SG questions were combined in different 
ways to arrive at values of a QALY. These vary from 
values which are in the vicinity of the current 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) threshold to extremely high values.  
With respect to relative weights, more research is 
required to explore methodological differences with 
respect to age and severity weighting. On valuation, 
there are particular issues concerning the extent to 
which ‘noise’ and ‘error’ in  people’s responses 
might generate extreme and unreliable figures. 
Methods of aggregation and measures of central 
tendency were issues in both weighting and valuation 









Over the past 25 years, the quality-adjusted life-           
year (QALY) has become the dominant 
measure of benefit assessment in health economic 
evaluation.1,2 Its use is now widespread, particularly 
in the various health technology assessment 
agencies around the globe, and most notably in the 
UK through the assessment procedures undertaken 
by the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE).3 Nevertheless, almost since 
the QALY was introduced to the health economics 
literature, the importance of the context in which 
health gains are produced has been discussed, 
raising the question of whether ‘a QALY is a QALY 
is a QALY’.4,5 Williams has said: ‘there is nothing 
in the QALY approach that requires QALYs to be 
used in a maximising context . . . more complex 
rules will almost certainly be needed if collective 
priority-setting is to reflect the views of the 
general public.’6 This issue has come to the fore 
again recently through NICE. A prescribed task 
of NICE is to assess health interventions in terms 
of their health gains relative to their costs, and to 
make recommendations as to whether or not an 
intervention should be adopted by the rest of the 
National Health Service (NHS) in England. 
 
However, it has been recognised that the Appraisal 
Committee at NICE will take characteristics of 
beneficiaries of such interventions into account 
in its deliberations.7 This raises an important 
policy question concerning whether quantitative 
estimates, reflecting the relative weight to be 
attached to health gains derived by different 
beneficiaries, can be elicited from a survey of the 
general public and thus be used to assist the NICE 
process. 
 
Furthermore, the NICE approach involves making 
recommendations based on evaluations of single 
health-care interventions, which inevitably involve 
judgements about whether the QALYs gained are 
worthwhile.8,9 If it is thought necessary to have such 
benefits and costs expressed in a common metric, 
usually money, this raises a second policy question: 
what is the monetary value of a QALY? The 
threshold monetary value of a QALY used by NICE 
was queried by the House of Commons Health 
Select Committee in 2007,10 thus highlighting the 
importance of this policy issue. 
The Social Value of a QALY (SVQ) Team was 
contracted from October 2004  to  January  2008 
to undertake two studies, each based on a survey 
of the population in England. The first was the 
‘relativities study’, which had the following aims: 
 
• to identify characteristics of beneficiaries of 
health care over which relative weights were to 
be derived; and 
• to estimate the relative weights to be attached 
to health gains according to the characteristics 
of the recipients of these gains. 
 
The second was the ‘valuation study’, which had 
the following aim: 
 
• to assess the feasibility of deriving a monetary 
value of a QALY. 
 
The rest of this report is organised into six further 
chapters as follows. We begin with a brief review of 
the literature on QALY weights and survey-based 
approaches to assessing the monetary value of a 
QALY, highlighting articles of particular interest 
and concluding with the challenges encountered in 
this project. Chapters 3–5 focus on the relativities 
study. In Chapter 3 we describe the methods and 
results of exploratory and developmental work 
to identify attributes and the development of a 
diagrammatic approach to the presentation of 
survey questions. We adopted two methodological 
approaches (which nevertheless share some 
commonalities) to the elicitation of preference 
data to be used in estimating relative weights, with 
respondents to the relativities survey answering 
both matching (or person trade-off) and discrete 
choice questions. The design, analysis and results 
of the discrete choice part of the survey are 
described in Chapter 4, with the same aspects of 
the matching part of the survey being outlined in 
Chapter 5. The valuation survey is described in 
Chapter 6. Two further introductory remarks are 
worth making at this point. Despite the extensive 
analyses undertaken to date, the results are 
nevertheless preliminary; for example, there is 
considerable scope to link the two data sets from 
the relativities survey, which may help to resolve 
some of the issues raised later in the report. An 









Until such analyses have been completed, it is fair 
to say that the groups within the Team [broadly, 
Newcastle-led and University of East Anglia (UEA)- 
led] have differing perspectives on the two main 
approaches to the relativities work; the Newcastle- 
led group thinks that both exercises have their 
 
merits, while the UEA-led group stands by the 
methods and results from the matching study. The 
report, therefore, concludes with further details  
on these differing perspectives, as well as a brief 
discussion and recommendations, largely for future 







Weighting and valuing QALYs: 
literature and challenges 
 
Estimating relative weights 
for QALYs 
Several authors have discussed the theoretical, 
ethical and practical issues around distributional 
weights for QALYs,11–13 and there have been a 
number of attempts to estimate weights.11,14,15 
 
Dolan et al.16 provide the most comprehensive 
review in this field to date. Using a ‘citation pearl 
growing’ search strategy, they identify 78 papers, 
dated 2001 or earlier, of which 64 include empirical 
data. There is growing evidence from (mainly 
survey-based) studies of the general population  
that the number of QALYs gained is likely to be 
traded off against other factors. Efforts to identify 
these other factors have indicated a wide range of 
possibilities, but there remain inconsistencies and 
contradictory findings. The list of factors identified 
by Dolan et al. (drawn from both the empirical and 
theoretical literature) are as follows: age, severity 
of illness (or starting point health state), end 
point/final health state, culpability/responsibility 
for ill health, having dependants, socioeconomic 
characteristics, gender, ethnicity, inequalities in 
health, and the concentration or dispersion of the 
distribution of a fixed health gain. The reviewers 
conclude that despite a growing body of literature, 
there are contradictory findings, many studies 
involve small samples and few attempt to estimate 
weights. Earlier, Schwappach17 described two 
categories of factors that could influence social 
value: (1) characteristics of beneficiaries, and 
(2) characteristics of the intervention’s effect on 
patients’ health, adding the factors of prior health 
consumption of patients, the duration of benefit 
and whether the gain in health is an improvement 
or the prevention of a decline. 
 
In the period since these reviews, there have been 
further contributions to the literature. Two of these 
used discrete choice data, examining attributes 
such as age, culpability (e.g. related to alcohol 
consumption), expected length of survival, time on 
waiting list and whether a previous transplant had 
been received;18 and lifestyle, socioeconomic status, 
 
age, life expectancy, quality of life (QoL) after 
treatment and level of past use of health care.19 The 
results indicate that several factors, in addition to 
health gain, influence people’s choices. However, 
unlike the studies described in this report, these 
studies were either condition specific or not based 
on a population sample of respondents. 
 
Projects attempting to derive QALY weights are 
faced with three significant challenges: identifying 
characteristics of beneficiaries over which weights 
should be derived; designing and presenting 
questions so that respondents can understand 
complexities and make choices; and elicitation of 
quantitative preference data from members of the 
general public to allow the estimation of QALY 
weights. 
 
Designing questionnaires that respondents can 
engage with was a particular challenge in this 
study because our aim was to estimate the relative 
value of different types of decontextualised, 
generic QALY gains. Without context, however, 
questions can seem overly abstract to respondents. 
There is also evidence that different ‘types’ of 
decontextualised QALY (e.g. life-saving or QoL- 
enhancing QALYs) will be regarded differently,20,21 
and so the presentation of questions needed to 
be flexible enough to incorporate different QALY 
types. 
 
Valuing QALYs in monetary 
terms 
The concept of willingness to pay (WTP) has 
existed for a long time.22,23 However, not until the 
1980s did government Transport Departments 
worldwide consider using the method to value lives 
saved from safety projects, rather than the gross 
output (‘productivity’) approach used previously.24 
Arguably, the most natural measure of the extent of 
a person’s preference for anything is the maximum 
amount that they would be willing to pay for it. 
Under what has naturally come to be known as the 
‘willingness-to-pay’ approach to valuation of safety, 








one seeks to establish the maximum amounts that 
those affected would individually be willing to pay 
for (typically small) improvements in their own and 
others’ safety. These amounts are then aggregated 
across individuals to arrive at an overall value for 
the safety improvement concerned, thus reflecting 
society’s overall resource constraint. 
 
Estimating a WTP-based monetary value of a 
QALY can also be viewed as a group-aggregate 
WTP for marginal gains in health, at least in the 
case of a randomly-selected sample of the public. 
Indeed, this argument has been used in promoting 
an insurance-based approach to valuing publicly- 
provided health care, whereby respondents are 
informed of the probabilities of needing care, as 
well as of it being successful, before providing a 
valuation.25,26 
 
The WTP method was first applied in health to 
value heart attack prevention.27 Subsequently, 
there were few such studies in health, probably as 
a result of the view that such monetary valuation 
was unethical. In addition, the use of WTP to 
inform decisions about allocation of health care, 
which is supposed to be on the basis of (some 
notion of) need, may look problematic because 
WTP is obviously associated with ability to pay. 
However, it has been shown that this need not 
impede the use of WTP in health economic 
evaluation28 and that, indeed, QALYs suffer from 
the same phenomenon.29 Since the early 1990s, the 
feasibility of using WTP in health economics has 
again been recognised,25,30 and more studies have 
been undertaken.31,32 
 
Thus, in health, WTP methods historically 
addressed decision-making dilemmas assessing 
relative utility of treatments at two main levels: 
(1) for a given group of patients (involving 
elicitation of values from samples of such patients), 
and (2) across disparate programmes funded 
by geographically-defined health organisations 
(involving elicitation from the community of WTP 
values for each programme at stake). Methods 
have been developed which work well in terms of 
WTP values reflecting patient preferences.33 In the 
latter area, methods have been more problematic, 
but are improving.34,35 As in other public sector 
areas, results have been mixed on how sensitive 
WTP responses are to the size of the good (i.e. 
the health change/numbers treated) on offer to 
respondents36–38 and to other aspects related to 
‘framing’ and programme information presented 
to respondents.39,40 However, innovations in valuing 
 
safety improvements derived by Carthy et al.41 
have shown promise in overcoming these issues. 
Methods based on these developments, consistent 
with the notion of starting with ‘marginal’ gains 
(in this case, in health), are described below. For 
valuing a QALY, the challenge is to start with a 
health gain or detriment which is not so large as  
to hit respondents’ budget constraints, but not so 
small that respondents are unwilling to trade it off 
against a risky situation in the standard gamble 
(SG) type question, also involved in a procedure of 
the sort devised by Carthy et al.41 
 
Through the 1990s, development of national-level 
technology assessment agencies led to calls for 
monetary values of a QALY to aid decision making 
at a national level.42,43 In the UK, there has been 
significant debate about the empirical basis of 
the cost-per-QALY threshold above/below which 
NICE would recommend rejection/adoption of a 
therapy by the NHS. For example, the proceedings 
of the 2007 House of Commons Health Select 
Committee criticise the current NICE threshold 
on the bases that it ‘. . . is not based on empirical 
research and is not directly related to the NHS 
budget, nor is it at the same level as that used by 
PCTs [primary care trusts] in providing treatments 
not assessed by NICE.’ Following previous 
literature, the implication is that, once a budget is 
set for the NHS (such budget setting not being the 
responsibility of NICE), we can infer a threshold by 
observing the cost per QALY of treatments which 
are funded vis-à-vis those that are not.44 
 
Two related responses to these arguments can be 
made: (1) it is well known that the NHS at the 
local level is not systematic in how it makes such 
decisions, at least in economics terms;45 and (2) 
because the NHS is not good at curtailing existing 
therapies which are poor value for money, it is not 
really known whether the marginal cost per QALY 
within the rest of the NHS is indeed out of line 
with (i.e. lower than) that used by NICE. 
 
Given these significant challenges to ‘discovering’ 
a threshold, an alternative is to ask members of  
the public about their WTP for health gains. It 
may be thought that asking individuals about their 
WTP for such health gains from their own pockets 
would not be relevant to the issue of establishing 
a threshold value contingent on the size of the 
health-care budget. Indeed, Culyer et al.44 (p. 57) 
state ‘Therefore, information about how much an 
individual or society values improvements in health 








the NICE remit. These values could only be used as 
the appropriate threshold by NICE if it were also 
given responsibility to set the NHS budget.’ 
 
This is an internally consistent position. However, 
it does not diminish the importance of trying to 
establish what value(s) people actually do place on 
QALY gains. There are two main reasons for this. 
 
First, in a democratic society there is a case to be 
made for ensuring that the government’s budget- 
setting process should, as far as possible, be 
informed by the preferences of members of the 
public. While it is reasonable to expect negotiations 
between the Treasury and Department of Health 
to take account of a number of factors, information 
regarding the public’s WTP for health care should 
arguably constitute an important consideration. 
 
Second, a theoretical argument is that, when 
assessing WTP questions in surveys, if respondents 
think of the NHS as being at full efficiency and 
unable to provide more services (or QALYs) without 
extra payments being made, then expressed WTP 
amounts would be a reasonable representation of 
a value of a QALY at the margin for the NHS and 
not far removed from what a budget-holder, like a 
PCT, might say is the value (if PCTs used QALYs 
 
and if they behaved in an economically rational 
and QALY-maximising fashion!). 
 
If the present study were to suggest that eliciting  
a robust monetary value of a QALY is feasible, 
and if a suitably representative sample survey 
were then undertaken, it would make a significant 
contribution to policy with respect to thresholds. 
 
However, suitable existing evidence is scant and 
of variable quality. Some estimates have been 
made of the value of a QALY based either on 
modelling approaches or on survey research.46,47 
Modelling studies have been reviewed elsewhere 
and values of a QALY vary greatly depending on 
how the data are manipulated.48 Moreover, survey 
work on the value of a QALY has been limited. 
Typically, individuals have been asked about their 
WTP for health gains for which quality 
adjustment factors have been obtained from 
another sample without fully adjusting for 
uncertainty (i.e. by presenting scenarios involving 
certain gains in QoL) and, in some cases, eliciting 
values from patients and not from members of the 
general public.47,49,50 Only one such estimate exists 
for a European country.47 The research undertaken 
in this study, therefore, represents a significant 






Identification and presentation 
of attributes for QALY weights 
 
Introduction 
The first objective of the relativities study, ‘to 
identify characteristics of beneficiaries of health 
care over which relative weights are to be derived’, 
requires qualitative enquiry. This precedes the 
quantitative estimation of the relative importance 
placed on those characteristics, once established. 
While the quantitative study is reported in two 
subsequent sections, reflecting two methodological 
approaches, these approaches share a common 
empirical foundation based on in-depth 
exploratory and developmental research. 
 
The selection of attributes for inclusion in the 
relativities study is crucial. The inclusion of an 
attribute without a robust rationale for doing so, 
or the omission of an important attribute, will lead 
to misleading conclusions. Qualitative techniques 
are increasingly used to establish appropriate 
attributes, particularly for discrete choice studies.51 
In this study we have taken a predominantly 
qualitative approach and supplemented 
conventional methods with other techniques. This 
exploratory phase of the project was an iterative 
process, involving three waves of focus groups with 
members of the general public, and use of a range 
of methods including: open-ended discussion; 
simple ranking procedures; experimentation with 
sample questions; and a more complex ranking 
task involving card sorting (Q methodology). 
Qualitative findings were interpreted alongside the 
results of the other methods used. 
 
Most of this chapter is taken up by reporting on  
the three main methods used to identify the most 
important characteristics of beneficiaries, followed 
by a description of the development of methods 
used to present information to respondents using 
innovative diagrammatic representations, before, 
finally, describing the format of the questionnaires, 
presented using a computer-assisted personal 
interview (CAPI). 
Methods 
Focus groups were facilitated by two or more 
members of the research team depending on the 
size of the group. Discussions were introduced 
and guided by the focus group leader. Other 
researchers were available to help distribute 
materials and answer questions during individual 
exercises. Group discussions were recorded using a 
digital voice recorder and transcribed verbatim. All 
focus groups received an introductory description 
of the project and the problem at hand. This took 
the form of a brief presentation followed by the 
opportunity to ask questions. Participants were 
then guided through two or more tasks. 
 
During the first wave of focus groups, we adopted 
open-ended qualitative techniques to elicit 
views and to probe responses. Respondents were 
advised that resources to provide health services 
are constrained and, as such, difficult choices 
must be made about the types of treatments and 
interventions that are provided by the NHS and, 
by implication, those that are not. The focus group 
leader introduced notions of scarcity of resources, 
carefully, and in simple terms (see Appendix 1). 
Essentially respondents were asked to accept the 
inevitability of rationing (although that term was 
not used) and that with or without the views of 
the general public, priority setting will happen. 
There was positive acceptance of these facts and 
respondents were comfortable proceeding on that 
basis. They were asked to suggest what sorts of 
things should be taken into account when such 
decisions are made. 
 
Despite interesting discussions (a summary of 
which is presented below), participants often  
had difficulty absorbing and expressing opinions 
about the concepts we wanted them to explore. 
Generally, respondents readily proposed issues 
such as the size of the health gain, cost, QoL and 
life extension, but when asked to ‘go beyond’ 








these concepts there was difficulty (or perhaps 
reluctance). If the group discussion then stalled, 
examples of possible issues for discussion were 
suggested by group facilitators, but the results 
of this approach raised concerns about leading 
respondents and endowing particular attributes 
with validity simply by mentioning them. 
 
In the second wave of focus groups, we included a 
simple ranking task both as a means of generating 
some crude data and to stimulate discussion. 
Respondents were asked to rank order a set of 10 
cards printed with issues that might be considered 
in priority setting, such as ‘quality of life of patients 
before treatment’ or ‘the social class of patients 
typically affected’. Participants in these focus 
groups were also presented with some examples 
of the types of questions that would be used in the 
quantitative study, stimulating debate about the 
inclusion of different attributes as well as providing 
valuable information on the appropriateness of 
different modes of presentation. 
 
In the third wave of focus groups, we introduced 
Q sort techniques which are sufficiently distinct 
to warrant a separate section and this follows the 
general findings. Q sorting involves arranging a 
number of cards, printed with statements about 
the topic, according to an instruction such as ‘from 
most agree to most disagree’. Allowing focus groups 
to begin with individual Q sort activities and 
following this with discussion enabled respondents 
to express their views (via the Q sort) before 
engaging in discussion with others. They also 
entail a common stimulus set (in this case 46 cards 
printed with different statements about the issue at 
hand). These results are, therefore, unencumbered 
by the input of the focus group leader, or by the 
views of others during discussion. 
 
Focus groups were conducted with groups of 
between 4 and 10 respondents and organised in 
three waves of data collection in Newcastle upon 
Tyne and Norwich between March and November 
2005. Participants in the Newcastle groups were 
recruited through a social research company 
(NWA Social and Market Research) based in the 
north-east of England and £20 was paid to each 
participant in recognition of their travel expenses 
and time. Participants in Norwich were recruited 
from an existing university database of members 
of the general public who had consented to be 
contacted for research. A total of 126 respondents 
(42 in Norwich and 84 in Newcastle) took part in 
focus groups. 
Qualitative findings based 
on open-ended discussion 
As already stated, the use of open-ended qualitative 
techniques was only a partial success. This may 
reflect the fact that respondents do not necessarily 
have a readily articulated account of their views 
on such complex issues, or that they were unsure 
about the kinds of things we were asking them 
to consider. In general, respondents were far 
more comfortable talking about health-related 
characteristics than they were discussing social 
or personal characteristics of the beneficiaries of 
health care. We do not report a complete, formal 
qualitative analysis because of the nature of these 
data, our own objectives and word limits. Instead, a 
summary is given of the nature of the discussion on 
each issue, including some brief illustrative quotes, 




Age was important to participants for a variety of 
reasons (which are also well documented in the 
literature). In different accounts, the young were 
favoured because of: their longer life expectancy; 
fair innings arguments; current and future 
contributions to society; and productivity. This was 
not uncontested; others argued the deservedness 
of older people, whose life-long contributions 
to the financing of the health services should be 
recognised: 
 
I would still veer towards [the] 7 year old 
because the 7 year old’s got all its life in front 
of it, whereas the 70 year old has had 70 years 
of life. 
Focus group respondent, Newcastle, 
May 2005 
 
Age is also a ‘proxy’ for a range of other 
characteristics. Whether or not  potential 
patients are economically active has already 
been mentioned, but patients’ social and familial 
networks were also linked to their age. The 
most obvious connection made was ages when 
patients are likely to be in their childbearing and 
childrearing years. 
 
‘The average age of patients at time of illness’ was 
ranked 4th highest of 10 in the simple ranking 
exercise (below cards listing QoL, life expectancy 









In early focus groups, discussion about prioritising 
health care for people with dependants sparked off 
quite significant disagreements. As well as the view 
that we had expected, i.e. that some respondents 
might attach positive weight to health gains to 
people with young children or other dependants, 
there was also strong opposition to this view which 
rejected the diversion of health care funds in favour 
of people who had made a choice to have children: 
 
. . . first of all I thought that might influence my 
decision if they had dependants . . . but then I 
thought about it in another way, it seems unfair 
if you do have dependants that just because 
you’ve got dependants its influencing your 
decisions . . . that you get that intervention, so it 
seems unfair. 
Focus group respondent, Newcastle, 
May 2005 
 
Such positive weighting of health gain for people 
with dependants was also seen as discriminatory 
against the childless. Others pointed out that 
people can be good and bad ‘carers’ but that 
favouring those with dependants seems to indicate 
a moral worthiness to this role in exclusion of other 
roles in a community: 
 
Making moral judgements is dodgy . . . part of 
it seems to be about how worthy somebody is 
to be given resources. Because they may have 
dependants but their quality of care might not 
be great to those dependants, not all parents 
are good at parenting. Whereas their value in 
life might be that they’re very good at their job, 
or they’re very good as a friend. 
Focus group respondent, Newcastle, 
May 2005 
 
In the simple ranking, the average rank for 




In a similar vein to the comments on dependants, 
the issue of whether lifestyle (or ‘culpability’) 
should be taken into account divided respondents. 
The process of discussion and the views of others 
also seemed to affect respondents’ stated views. 
Here, issues of choice and control, addiction and 
social/environmental influences were mentioned. 
Respondents appreciated the difficulty many 
addicts have in quitting, as well as the fact that, 
for older people, information about the risks of 
some behaviours had not been available (in the 
following quotes, different focus group respondents 
are distinguished using letters, e.g. respondent G, 
respondent B): 
 
G Lifestyle is a much more complex thing 
than just yes or no choice. 
B Yes, its what people, people like smokers 
they’re . . . 
G Stressed or . . . 
B . . . they’re stressed or living in absolute 
poverty and have to . . . you know, that’s 
why they’ve got . . . 
K And actually smoking is very difficult to  
give up. It’s no good saying, oh well people 
smoke therefore it’s not right, it’s very 
difficult to give up. 
Focus  group  discussion, Newcastle, 
May 2005 
 
A small number wanted to prioritise those who take 
care of their own health above those who smoke or 
drink, but most had difficulty sustaining a logical 
argument in the face of disagreement. Obesity 
seemed to generate different views than smoking 
and alcohol and was used as an example of the 
‘slippery slope’ down which such discussion can 
descend. The culpability argument was applied to  
a wide range of activities, including sports injuries, 
for example: 
 
P But it’s starting on the slippery slope isn’t 
it? Where do you draw the line? 
N It doesn’t harm them drinking a little bit. 
P Going on from alcohol to diet . . . because 
people are fat should we penalise them? 
Focus  group  discussion, Newcastle, 
May 2005 
 
Discussion about liver replacement (which usually 
centred on the ‘George Best case’) resulted in more 
respondents wanting to incorporate lifestyle into 
decisions, but the dominant view was that everyone 
should be entitled to a first chance at treatment, 
regardless of past lifestyle. After that, failing to 
follow medical advice would be regarded negatively. 
Discussions usually concluded (not necessarily with 
consensus) that this is a problematic area and that 
prevention and health education are important  
areas for funding. 
 
In the simple ranking task, ‘Whether or not the 
patients live a healthy lifestyle’ was ranked in the 
middle, at 5th on average. 







Socioeconomic status: some 
conflicting evidence 
Findings from open discussions about the 
importance of socioeconomic status were often 
difficult to interpret, in particular because a range 
of issues are conflated, although the simple ranking 
and Q sort data would suggest that socioeconomic 
group should not be included as an attribute. 
 
There are several socioeconomic issues which 
were mentioned. The first (and probably the main 
one we had anticipated) is linked to alleviation of 
deprivation and the prioritisation of interventions 
aimed at this over other interventions which may 
have a higher potential health gain, but which 
do not deal with inequalities. Individuals’ ability 
to pay was commonly mentioned in this area and 
appeared to cloud the issue of inequality – the 
rich being able to pay being seen as a pragmatic 
solution rather than an issue of equity. Some 
respondents were adamant that socioeconomic 
considerations should not be taken into account, 
and cited the foundations of the NHS and equal 
treatment of all. In group discussions, the different 
socioeconomic issues were generally not delineated 
or articulated clearly. In one group, a respondent 
(who was also a health professional) raised the 
issue of inequalities. Otherwise people argued for 
dealing with poverty, not for giving poor people 
‘preferential treatment’. Several respondents 
were appalled at the suggestion that health care 
might be prejudiced against people with higher 
socioeconomic status, especially as they had 
contributed to the NHS through higher taxes. 
 
‘The social class of patients typically affected’ 
was ranked last (10/10) on average in the simple 
ranking. There were, however, some concerns 
that social class, without further explanation, was 
being interpreted by some to mean discriminating 
against those in more deprived groups. (The Q sort 
statements made more explicit the ‘direction of 
effect’.) 
 
Quality of life of beneficiaries 
This health-related factor was discussed at some 
length in all focus groups. There were two main 
arguments. The first related to the relationship 
between length of life and QoL, the thrust of 
opinion focusing on the unnecessary extension of 
life in older people experiencing poor levels of 
QoL: 
You wouldn’t want to live longer in a worse 
health state, quality of life is the important 
thing. 
Focus group participant, Norwich, 
March 2005 
 
The second argument related to the ‘starting 
point’ QoL before treatment and the relationship 
between that starting point and the amount of QoL 
gained through treatment. Here, some respondents 
observed that an improvement in QoL for people  
in very poor health would be more important than 
an identical improvement in QoL for people in 
relatively good health. 
 
The following illustrative quote refers to an 
example of a question in which QoL is represented 
on a scale from 0 to100, using percentages for ease: 
 
I went for (choice) ‘A’ because I thought that 
a jump from 20% to 40% would make a huge 
difference, a bigger difference than from 70% 
to 90%. I can imagine 70% being a healthy 
state that you could quite easily live and not 
have to take too many treatments and that kind 
of thing, whereas 20% is pretty close to death. 
Focus group participant, Newcastle, 
May 2005 
 
Results based on simple 
ranking 
A subgroup of 19 respondents (aged 20–62, 
10 female) rank ordered a set of possible attributes 
according to their importance and discussed 
their rankings. They were also invited to add any 
additional attributes (writing them onto blank cards 
provided) and incorporate those into their ranking. 
Table 1 presents the average ranking of each item. 
This is only illustrative; respondents’ rankings are 
not intended to be interpreted in isolation of their 
comments and the results of other methods. 
 
Respondents’ comments during this task revealed 
multiple understandings of the attributes 
as well as a small number of common views. 
Respondents were comfortable and confident 
talking about health-related attributes and less  
so when discussing non-health-related attributes. 
Socioeconomic status and gender were considered 
irrelevant to issues of prioritisation by all 
respondents. Whether or not patients had had a  







TABLE 1 Simple ranking exercise 
 
Rank Average ranka Attributes 
1 2.9 QoL of patients before treatment 
2 3.1 Whether there is no other treatment available 
3 3.2 The life expectancy of patients before treatment 
4 4.4 The average age of patients at time of illness 
5 5.9 Whether or not the patients live a healthy lifestyle 
6 6.1 Whether or not the patients have had a lot of health care in the past 
7 6.3 Whether or not the patients have dependants 
8 7.4 Whether or not the patients are currently working 
9 9.0 The gender of patients typically affected 
10 9.2 The social class of patients typically affected 
a Average rank is simply the mean ranking given to the listed attributes (n = 19). 
 
as the health service having failed them and issues 
of ‘orphan drugs’ were difficult for respondents to 
appreciate and were not covered by the lack of any 
other treatment. 
 
While the qualitative data and simple ranking data 
provide a good grounding in the issues in question, 
we felt it was insufficient for the selection of 
attributes and so incorporated a third method, Q 
methodology. This is relatively unfamiliar to most 
and so requires separate explanation below. 
 
Q methodology 
The basic features of Q methodology 
Q methodology52–54 is used to study the nature of 
views, opinions and beliefs. It is a useful addition to 
qualitative methods, especially where respondents 
do not necessarily have readily articulated accounts 
of their views on a topic. 
 
The two main features of a Q study are the data 
collection method – which is based on a card 
sorting technique (the ‘Q sort’) – and a form of 
factor analysis which is used to analyse patterns 
between the card sorts to reveal a small number 
of underlying perspectives. There are several 
key terms that are used in Q studies. The ‘Q 
sort’ provides the primary data source in Q 
methodology. Respondents sort a set of statement 
cards, known as the ‘Q set’. The Q set comprises 
a number of statements which cover the range of 
viewpoints and opinions on the particular topic  
of interest. Respondents consider each card in 
turn and assign it in a quick, initial sort, to one 
of three piles: agree, disagree or neutral. A more 
detailed arrangement of cards then follows, using 
a grid such as the one reproduced in Figure 1. 
Factors are the result of Q analysis, the aim of 
which is to identify shared views and meanings that 
exist around a topic (via correlations between the 
positioning of cards by respondents). 
 
Each space in the grid indicates the positioning 
of a card on the continuum from –5 to +5. Two 
items are placed in the ‘+/–5’ positions, four items 
in the ‘4’ and ‘3’ positions and so on. Making use 
of the three initial piles, respondents are asked to 
consider the cards in their ‘agree’ pile, select two 
cards that they ‘most agree’ with and place these 
in the +5 column. Next, selecting from the cards 
that they disagree with, respondents are asked 
to select the two cards that they ‘most disagree’ 
with, and place those cards in the –5 column. This 
process is repeated until all cards are placed (46 
in this example), finishing at the centre of the 
distribution. Often the Q data (i.e. the positioning 
of the cards in the Q sort) are supplemented by 
a brief interview. In this study the Q sorts were 
followed by group discussion. 
 
Factors and factor loadings in Q 
methodology 
In Q methodology, ‘factors’ are distinct accounts, 
each one a shared point of view, relating to the 
topic studied, based on the correlations between 
respondents’ Q sorts. 
 
There are several types of information of interest 
in the interpretation of factors. The main source 
of information is a ‘collective’ Q sort (known as 
a factor array) for each factor, which is calculated 
from the individual Q sorts making up that factor 
and based on weighted averages. In other words, 
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for each factor, all of the statement cards can be 
placed on the Q grid, representing the relative 
importance of each statement to each factor. The 
statements placed in the +/–5 and +/–4 positions 
(representing strongly held views) are important in 
the interpretation of factors. 
 
Information is  also  generated  that  identifies 
those statements which significantly distinguish 
factors, as well as consensus statements which are 
positioned similarly across factors. ‘Factor loadings’ 
give us further information about the correlation 
between each individual’s own Q sort and each 
factor – see Appendix 2, which presents factor 
loadings for each respondent. Qualitative data 
collected during and after the Q sorts, including 
spoken and written comments, are also used to 
help understand the meanings contained in the Q 
sorts. 
 
The SVQ Q study 
Statements for inclusion in the Q sort were taken 
from the first wave of focus groups, conducted 
in March 2005. Using the audio-recordings of 
the group discussions, opinions expressed by 
respondents which related to the topic of interest 
were listed. A small number of statements thought 
to be of interest to the research questions, but 
not raised in the groups, were added. Duplicate 
statements were then deleted, selected statements 
were reworded to make them clearer, and the list 
was reduced to a set of 46 statements through a 
process of discussion within the research team. 
Pilot Q sorts were completed by a sample of the 
general public (n = 26) and a sample of Newcastle 
University staff members (n = 23). During this 
pilot, respondents were asked for comments 
about the set of statements; and in particular, to 
suggest anything that they felt was relevant that 
was not included in the statements. A revised set of 
statements was produced based on their comments. 
This final set of statements is reproduced in 
Appendix 3. 
 
In the final wave of focus groups, a subgroup of 27 
respondents (aged 20–84, 16 male) sorted a set of 
46 cards printed with statements about the topic in 
question, according to their agreement with them. 
 
SVQ Q findings 
A three-factor solution was derived using centroid 
factor analysis and judgemental rotation.55 Further 








Factor 1: egalitarianism 
The first factor identified appears to be an 
egalitarian account, rejecting prioritisation of 
health care according to characteristics such as 
social class, lifestyle or whether respondents have 
dependants. It is an account which is concerned  
not primarily with outcome but with entitlement, and 
equal access to health care for everyone. 
 
Table 2 lists the statements of most importance to 
factor 1. In the top half of the table are statements 
that found strong agreement in factor 1 (i.e. these 
were statements placed at +4 and +5 positions 
on the Q sort grid by respondents associated 
with this factor). The statements in the bottom 
half of the table (below the emboldened line)  
are those that provoked strong disagreement. All 
the statements of importance in this factor (with 
the possible exception of 6) reflect an egalitarian 
position: no distinction should be made between 
age groups, socioeconomic groups or those 
without dependants. In keeping the statements  
in the bottom half of the table, the –4 and –5 
positions are rejected by factor 1, supporting the 
interpretation. This factor refuses prioritisation on 
the basis of the characteristics of beneficiaries even 
when, as in statement 14, there is some implied 
gain in overall health in doing so. 
 
Factor 2: health benefits 
Factor 2 reveals a somewhat different point of view. 
This second account puts emphasis on outcome 
and the size of the health benefits – as revealed 
through the placing of statements 29, 31, and 44  
in the ‘most agree’ columns of the grid for this 
factor (Table 3). Interestingly, this is coupled with 
a rejection of any statements that make reference 
to socioeconomic and financial issues. All of the 
statements placed in the –4 and –5 positions (‘most 
disagree’) are of this nature. Preventive health 
care is also important in this, as it is in all three 
accounts. 
 
Factor 3: children and experts 
A third factor shared some views with those already 
described, but is distinguished by a concern 
for children’s health and a belief that health 
prioritisation decisions should be made by experts. 
Examination of the full set of statements and factor 
scores (see Appendix 3) reveals that factor 3 often 
shares views with factors 1 and 2 or occupies a 
space between them. However, focusing specifically 
on significantly distinguishing statements, we can 
detect the views that set this account apart – for 
example, statement 35 (‘The decisions about which 
services to fund, and how to spend NHS money 
should be made by the experts’), placed in the +3 
position for factor 3 and in –3 and 0 for factors 
1 and 2 respectively), and statement 13 (Table 4), 
placed in the +4 position for factor 3 but 0 for 
both factors 1 and 2. 
 
Once again, there is a notable reluctance to 
prioritise on the basis of other factors evidenced by 
the statements that are rejected. 
 
Overall Q findings 
Respondents associated with all three factors 
thought that health care should be based on some 
concept of need and not on other factors, such 
as socioeconomic characteristics (statement 30) 
or lifestyle factors (statement 41). There was a 
rejection of socioeconomic issues and statements 
about lifestyle, and dependants were placed in the 
middle (irrelevant) or at the ‘disagree’ end of the 
scale in all three factors. 
 
Summary 
Based on our qualitative and Q methodological 
enquiry, we rejected both lifestyle and 
socioeconomic status as attributes. Age, QoL and 
length of life were clearly issues of importance. The 
issue of whether beneficiaries of health care have 
dependants was slightly more difficult to resolve, 
but ultimately we took account of considerations 
of policy relevance, in consultation with 
representatives of NICE. It is difficult to conceive 
of a situation where NICE would recommend an 
intervention be made available only to people with 
dependants. 
 
Arriving at a list of key attributes for inclusion 
in quantitative survey questions is a difficult 
process. Increasingly, qualitative methods are 
built into the early stages of study designs. In 
the context of this study, the use of open-ended 
qualitative methods alone proved insufficient to 
determine the attributes, perhaps because of the 
complexity of the subject matter. Respondents 
appeared to be led by the suggestions of the 
focus group facilitator, and there remained 
uncertainties around particular attributes (such 
as socioeconomic status) following analysis of 
the qualitative data. In this case, Q methodology 
provided additional structure and the opportunity 
to use a standardised stimulus in both the 
generation of data and the analysis. With respect  
to socioeconomic status, for example, we were able 







TABLE 2 Salient statements for factor 1 
 
Number Statement Factor score 
11b Life is equally valuable whether you are young or old. +5 
15b Everybody, no matter what you are, whether you are young or old, should get the same 
access to and choice of treatment. 
+5 
41 Health care should be based on need, not on social circumstances, or addiction or weight 
or smoking or anything else. 
+4 
6b If someone is given treatment, like George Best, and then abuses their treatment, they 
should not be given repeated chances. If there are finite resources and a person has failed 
to take advantage of it, someone else should be given a chance. 
+4 
30 Social class should make no difference whatsoever for prioritising health care. If people 
need treatment, they need treatment. How well off they are shouldn’t come into it. 
+4 
25a People with dependants should not be given priority over people without dependants. A 
human life is a human life, I think it should be irrelevant how many dependants they’ve got. 
+4 
14b The age of the patient is important; if you were treating children rather than older people 
then you would have a longer improved life. 
–4 
20 People with dependants should be prioritised over people without dependants because 
their treatments would benefit others as well as the patient themselves. 
–4 
46 People who have already benefited from a lot of health care should take second place to 
people who have not used the health service as much. 
–4 
24 Whether or not people are currently working should be taken into account when we 
prioritise health care. 
–4 
3 People who live a healthy lifestyle should be prioritised because they would respond better 
to treatment. 
–5 
16b You should prioritise the younger age group, because they are still able to have children. –5 
a Denotes a statement which distinguishes factor 1 from factors 2 and 3 (p < 0.05). 
b Marks a significance level of p < 0.01. 
Consensus statements are shaded. 
 
 
to divide the broad issue into sub-issues that could 
be described in discrete statements. Factor analysis 
showed a good deal of consensus that these issues 
should not be part of health-care priority setting, 
and we selected age and severity as the attributes 
to bring forward into the quantitative analysis. 
Future research investigating the views of the 
public around complex issues should consider 




The presentation of the discrete choice and 
matching questions, including a detailed 
introductory explanation, was developed iteratively 
in focus groups. By far the most successful method 
was presentation of concepts of health (QoL), age, 
and health gains using diagrams. These diagrams 
were first explained by building them in small steps 
for respondents using an animated powerpoint 
presentation (reproduced in Appendix 4), which 
was ultimately incorporated into a CAPI. The 
diagrams were then presented either as choice 
questions or as matching questions, examples 
of which are shown in Figures 2 and 3. Choice 
questions (e.g. Figure 2) present respondents with 
a one-off choice between option A and option 
B, which differ in terms of health gains, ages of 
patients and levels of QoL. The two options are 
presented both diagramatically and descriptively 
in the accompanying text. Choice questions are 
explained in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Matching questions (e.g. Figure 3) present 
respondents with a series of iterative choices where 
the numbers of people in Groups A and B are 
varied until a point of equivalence is reached. The 
same size of health gain is presented in Group A as 
in Group B for each set of iterative choices. These 








TABLE 3 Salient statements for factor 2 
 







The quality of life of patients and their life expectancy are the most important things. The +5 
characteristics of patients like whether they are employed, or whether they have 
dependants, or what gender they are shouldn’t matter. 
Priority should be given to preventive health care rather than always focusing on cure once +5 
people are ill. 
The amount of health and quality of life improvement is the most important. It’s about +4 
getting the greatest benefit for the most people. 
30 Social class should make no difference whatsoever for prioritising health care. If people +4 







Priority should be given to preventive health care especially education in schools about +4 
diet and lifestyle choices. 
It’s no good saving lives if the quality of those lives is really bad. Some treatments are +4 
keeping people alive for too long. You’ve got to have a decent quality of life otherwise 
what’s the point of being alive. 
There should be ‘positive discrimination’ towards people who are disadvantaged and in ill 4 
health because they’ve got a lot to contend with already. 
Older people deserve to be given priority. They have been paying into the NHS all their 4 
lives, they deserve to be able to draw on those resources when they need it. 
24 Whether or not people are currently working should be taken into account when we 4 




People who smoke and drink pay enough in extra taxes to pay for their own health care. 4 
Poorer people should be given priority because they don’t have the same opportunities to 5 
take care of their own health. 
Whether or not patients can contribute financially towards the cost of the treatment 5 
should be taken into account because it would allow you to treat more people who can’t 
afford to ‘go private’. 
a Marks a significance level of p < 0.01. 
Consensus statements are shaded. 
 
 
The questionnaire instrument was then piloted 
using cognitive interviews with 42 respondents 
(27 in Norwich and 15 in Newcastle) and was well 
received. Respondents followed the introduction 
and understood the questions. Their comments 
resulted in only minor adjustments to the wording 
and number of questions in each version of the 
questionnaire. 
 
Survey sample and 
administration 
The discrete choice and matching questions were 
part of a longer questionnaire (incorporating 
attitudinal questions and sociodemographics), 
which was administered face to face, using a CAPI, 
by interviewers from NatCen. The interview began 
with some basic demographic and household 
questions, following which an animated powerpoint 
presentation explained the meaning of the 
diagrams step by step. Next the respondents 
 
answered six matching questions followed by 
eight discrete choice questions. There were four 
attitudinal questions, before some more detailed 
sociodemographic and health questions. On 
average, interviews lasted 41 minutes. 
 
The survey was administered by NatCen to a 
random sample (n = 587) of the population in 
England from February to April 2007. The sample 
was generated by NatCen from the population of 
adults (aged 18 and over) living in England. Thirty 
addresses were selected from each of 40 postcode 
areas, which were stratified by Government Office 
Region (nine regions) and the proportion of 
manual/non-manual households. Within each 
household, only one adult was eligible for inclusion 
in the study. In households with more than one 
eligible adult present, interviewers randomly 
selected one interviewee. A total of 243 (41%) were 
male, the mean age of the whole sample being 
52 years and, thus, females and older people are 
slightly over-represented. 







TABLE 4 Salient statements for factor 3 
 
Number Statement Factor score 
40 Priority should be given to preventive health care rather than always focusing on cure +5 
 once people are ill.  
23 Priority should be given to preventive health care especially education in schools about +5 
 diet and lifestyle choices.  
13a Age shouldn’t come into it, unless you’re talking about children. Children’s health should +4 
 be given priority over adults.  
41 Health care should be based on need, not on social circumstances, or addiction or weight 
or smoking or anything else. 
+4 
30 Social class should make no difference whatsoever for prioritising health care. If people 
need treatment, they need treatment. How well off they are shouldn’t come into it. 
+4 
31 The amount of health and quality of life improvement is the most important. It’s about 
getting the greatest benefit for the most people. 
+4 
24 Whether or not people are currently working should be taken into account when we 
prioritise health care. 
–4 
20 People with dependants should be prioritised over people without dependants because 
their treatments would benefit others as well as the patient themselves. 
–4 
3 People who live a healthy lifestyle should be prioritised because they would respond 
better to treatment. 
–4 
17 For relatively minor conditions patients who are of working age should take priority over 
people who are retired. 
–4 
9a People who smoke and drink pay enough in extra taxes to pay for their own health care. –5 
46 People who have already benefited from a lot of health care should take second place to 
people who have not used the health service as much. 
–5 
a Marks a significance level of p < 0.01. 










FIGURE 2 Examples of choice questions. (a) Screen 1: treatment for condition A results in a gain in life-years; treatment for condition 
B results in a gain in both quality of life (QoL) and length of life. (b) Screen 2: treatment for either condition A or condition B results in a 
gain in quality of life. (c) Screen 3: treatment for condition A results in a gain in quality of life; treatment for condition B results in a gain 
in length of life. 
(a) (b) 
(c) 





















FIGURE 3 Example of iterations within a single matching question based on responses shown. (a) Screen 1: untreated scenarios. (b) 
Screen 2: ‘with treatment’ scenarios showing health gains – condition A is chosen by the respondent. (c) Screen 3: when 40 people with 
condition A or 100 people with condition B can be treated, the respondent chooses B. (d) Screen 4: when 80 people with condition A 
or 100 people with condition B can be treated, the respondent chooses B. (e) Screen 5: when 95 people with condition A or 100 people 
with condition B can be treated, the respondent chooses A. (f) Screen 6: finally, when 90 people with condition A or 100 people with 







Discrete choice study 
 
Basic design 
In a discrete choice study, respondents are 
presented with a series of choice sets (usually 
pairwise). Each scenario in the set is defined 
according to some predefined attributes (ours 
being predetermined from the research reported 
in Chapter 3) and levels of such attributes. The 
attribute levels vary across scenarios and choice 
sets. In each choice set, the respondent is asked 
which scenario they prefer or would choose. 
Faced with a series of such choices, respondents 
essentially reveal how much weight they attach 
to each of the attributes, the actual weights being 
derived through statistical analysis of the data (see 
below). 
 
Table 5 lists the attributes introduced in the 
preceding chapter along with the levels for each 
that were used in the discrete choice study. 
 
The levels for the age variable were chosen 
to represent a range of stages of life: a very 
young child, a fully grown child and a young 
adult, followed by two or three further stages of 
adulthood into old age. The QoL if untreated 
variable again ranges from death through a series 
of better (though some still quite serious) states 
to 90%. The variables representing gains in life 
expectancy and QoL follow in large part from 
what was chosen for age and QoL if untreated. For 
example, to give a full number of life-years to a 
1-year-old who would otherwise die, the gain in life 
expectancy would be 79, and to return someone in 
a health state valued at 60% back to full health, a 
gain of 40% would be offered. Some levels of the 
 
life expectancy and QoL gain variables also reflect 
the desire to have some scenarios where people 
might get an improvement but not to full health or 
maximum life-years (the maximum here being 80). 
 
Using these variables and imposing some 
assumptions (such as people being in full health 
before the onset of illness), we constructed 
diagrams of the sort shown in Figure 2. QALY gains 
(shown as a dark shaded area in the diagrams) are 
calculated from the five attributes listed in Table 5. 
 
A full factorial design using the attributes listed 
in Table 5 would have resulted in (6)(7)(8)(4) 
(6) = 8064 possible profiles but there are many 
combinations of levels on these attributes that 
result in implausible scenarios. For example, ‘age 
at death’ must be greater than ‘age at onset’ of 
illness, and the gain in life expectancy added to 
the age at death if untreated cannot exceed some 
reasonable maximum age, which was constrained 
to be 80 years. The full list of constraints is listed in 
Appendix 5. After imposing these constraints, 6572 
of the possible 8064 profiles were implausible, 
leaving 1492 profiles (19% of the total). 
 
The experimental design software sas, which allows 
for constraints, was initially used to select choice 
sets from the 1492 profiles. This resulted in a 
design with over 200 profiles describing ‘age at 
onset’ as 1-year-olds and only 12 profiles describing 
70-year-olds. At this stage the design was altered 
manually to improve the balance of questions 
about different age groups. Clearly, such a severely- 
reduced set of available profiles, together with the 
manual alteration of the design to achieve greater 
 
 
TABLE 5 Attributes and levels 
 
 
Description of attribute Levels 
Age at onset (years) 1, 10, 20, 40, 60, 70 
Age at death if untreated (years) 1, 10, 20, 40, 60, 70, 80 
Gain in life expectancy (years) 0, 1, 5, 10, 20, 40, 60, 79 
QoL if untreated (represented as %) 0, 30, 60, 90 
Gain in QoL with treatment (%) 0, 10, 20, 40, 70, 100 
QoL, quality of life. 








balance, negatively affect the design properties 
that are desirable in discrete choice experiments 
(DCEs). Nevertheless, before administering the 
questionnaire, data were simulated to ensure that 
a model could be estimated on the basis of the 
amended design. 
 
Functional form and 
empirical approach 
Response data in DCEs are modelled within a 
random utility framework of the general form: 
 
U = V +  (1) 
 
in which utility, U, is separated into parts which 
are explainable, in this case V, and unexplainable, 
. In this study, we are concerned with estimating 
V, which represents an underlying continuous and 
latent variable which is nevertheless unobservable. 
 
If the standard QALY model is true, V would 
simply be a function of QALYs. If individuals are 
concerned about other characteristics, then these 
will also be part of the utility function. In this 
simple case we assume that utility is a function of 
age at onset (AO), age at death without treatment 
(AD), QoL lost without treatment (QL) and QALYs 
gained from treatment (QALY). This gives: 
 
V = f(AO, AD, QL, QALY) (2) 
 
QALYs multiplied by the magnitudes of the other 
variables, ensuring that with zero QALYs gained 
there is a zero impact on utility. Empirically, the 
multiplicative models presented below consistently 
outperformed those based on an additive 
functional form, which were also investigated. 
Although, it may appear that a multiplicative 
model of the form QALYs  AGE  SEVERITY, with 
just one age-related variable, would make more 
theoretical sense, we took the more pragmatic view 
that this would leave too much riding on the ‘age 
at onset’ variable in terms of what respondents 
might be thinking about in relation to age, and so 
we included age at death as well. In addition, this 
was the best performing model empirically, which, 
it could be argued, is important for estimating 
weights. 
 
If we assume such a multiplicative underlying 











This is a standard log-linear utility function where 
the s are parameters to be estimated. Given that 
discrete choice response data are based on choices 
over alternative combinations of the dependent 
variables, then, assuming that the  parameters are 
identical across all individuals, a simple model of 
the following form can be estimated: 
log(V)=β (∆log(AO))+β  (∆log(AD)) 
1 2 
Quality of life lost (QL) is transformed from a +β (∆log(QL))+β  (∆log(QALY)) (4) 
3 4 
variable in Table 5, by subtracting ‘quality of life if 
untreated’ from 1. This is done in order to facilitate 
the log transformation required below – with 
some scenarios involving instant death, and thus 
a QoL of zero, which could not otherwise have 
been log transformed. Note, therefore, that when 
interpreting this variable, the larger the ‘quality of 
life lost’ at the onset of illness, the more ‘severe’ the 
health state. 
 
The first two terms on the right-hand side of (2) 
detect age effects, QL detects severity and QALY 
is the health gain. If expressed as an additive 
function, this would mean that gains in utility 
could be experienced even if QALY gains were 
zero, i.e. age and severity would have effects on 
utility irrespective of whether or not QALY gains 
are incurred. The alternative, therefore, was to use 
a multiplicative form of the utility function. The 
QALY itself is a multiplicative function of life-years 
and QoL gained. By extension, in a multiplicative 
form of the above function, utility is derived from 
where  represents the differences in levels of any 
given attribute reflected in the pairwise choices 
presented. 
 
Equation (4) was estimated using a logit model 
(see ‘simple’ model under Discrete choice results), 
allowing for clustering of the individual standard 
errors to account for the fact that each individual 
responded to several questions. Essentially, this 
amounts to a conditional logit model. 
 
A flexible functional form (referred to below as 
the ‘powered’ model) was also specified to allow 
for any non-linear relationships between choice 
and the included variables. While the standard log 
model allows for non-linearities, these functions 
are monotonic, this restriction possibly being too 
strong and resulting in biased estimates. Including 
higher order terms, in a fashion analogous to the 
popular translog model,56 allows for modelling 








flexible functional forms provides more robust 
estimation of the coefficients and reduces the 
potentially confounding problems of omitted 
variable bias. This also allows us to investigate 
the non-linearities detected in the matching data 
(see Chapter 5). All models were tested using the 
Akakie and Bayesian information criteria in order 
to aid model selection. Those which performed 
best on these criteria are reported below. 
 
Discrete choice results 
A total of 587 respondents yielded 4696 useable 
responses to the discrete choice questions. The 
estimated models are shown in Table 6. We did also 
take a more conventional econometric  approach 
of converting covariates into categorical variables 
(i.e. sets of dummy variables) within the basic 
multiplicative framework. However, these models 
did not perform as well as those reported and are 
more challenging for calculation of weights. 
 
The coefficients for the simple model suggest that 
increasing age at onset reduces the probability 
of choice, as does increasing the age at death, 
although the former is not statistically significant. 
This suggests that the young are preferred to the 
old. The coefficient on QoL lost is also negative, 
suggesting that as the health state is more severe 
the respondents are less likely to choose that group. 
Finally, the impact of QALY is positive, as we would 
 
 
TABLE 6 Simple and powered models 
 
expect. The impact of severity, as it appears in the 
regression results, appears to contradict earlier 
literature. However, a more accurate picture of the 
impact of all of the variables is provided through 
examination of the shapes of the functional forms, 
which, for the simple model, are given in Figures 
4–7. These diagrams show the shapes of the 
functional relationships when measured on a single 
scale, as represented by the ‘predicted utility’ axes. 
Here, it can be seen that that the general impact   
of the QoL lost variable on utility is very small, the 
inference being that the severity–utility relationship  
is essentially flat and nearly so for age. 
 
The equivalent diagrams for the powered models 
are shown in Figures 8–11. Once again, the sign of 
the coefficients in the regression model inform us 
of the direction of impact on utility for age at onset 
(individuals who are aged around 10–40 years 
are slightly preferred to the very young and the 
very old), age at death (slight preferences to save 
those who die young and those who will die old 
rather than the middle aged) and severity (a 
preference for individuals with lower severity, with 
the maximum at 0.4, after which predicted utility 
slopes downwards showing less preference for 
purely life-saving interventions). However, Figures 
8–10 demonstrate, once again, the relationship 
between each of these variables and utility to be 
essentially flat. This is reinforced by the lack of 
statistical significance on some of the coefficients, 
especially for age at onset and, this time, QoL 
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FIGURE 5 Age at death vs utility. 
 
Simple model Powered model 
Coefficients Standard error p-value Coefficients Standard error p-value 
log AO –0.02 0.022 0.304 –0.31 0.264 0.240 
(log AO)2    0.24 0.164 0.151 
(log AO)3    –0.04 0.025 0.107 
log AD –0.07 0.034 0.034 1.28 0.314 0.000 
(log AD)2    –0.76 0.175 0.000 
(log AD)3    0.11 0.025 0.000 
log QL –0.14 0.037 0.000 –0.64 0.372 0.085 
(log QL)2    –0.43 0.489 0.381 
(log QL)3    –0.09 0.149 0.559 
log QALY 0.75 0.033 0.000 0.45 0.054 0.000 
(log QALY)2    –0.03 0.028 0.237 
(log QALY)3    0.03 0.007 0.000 
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FIGURE 11 QALY vs utility (powered model). 
 
lost. Nevertheless, weights were calculated using 
the point estimates from the powered regression, 
regardless of statistical significance. This approach 
is used for a number of reasons: first, the model 
is the best performing in diagnostic tests; second, 
we cannot rule out joint significance; and third, 
and most importantly, when calculating weights 
from any model, the point estimates from that 
model (regardless of which approach is used) are 
our most informed values. While it is possible to 
use hypothesis testing to determine whether our 
estimates are significantly different to zero, this 
does not provide better information than the point 
estimates. Also, because of what was revealed by 
the directions of the coefficients in the regression 
models, the results on severity are further 
investigated (see Further investigation of severity). 
Figure 11 shows that increasing QALYs are always 
preferred. Concavity is still observed, but less so 
than in the simple model. 
 
Weighting QALYs using 
discrete choice data 
Two novel ways of estimating weights from the 
above models have been devised, one based on 
predicted probabilities of choice and the other 
based on a compensating variation approach. As 
indicated above, for each, the weights presented 









Predicted probability of choice 
approach 
The weights are estimated using the estimated 
probability of choice, with a base case of AO = 40, 
AD = 60, QL = 0.7, and QALY = 4 (i.e. individuals 
fall ill at 40, lose 0.7 of their QoL, will die at 
60 without treatment, and are then given four 
QALYs with treatment). The way in which the four 
QALYs have been allocated is unspecified in this 
model. This choice of a base case is challenging 
for interpretation of subsequent weights, in that 
it may be thought better to choose an extreme 
position and then measure weights for every other 
scenario in one direction relative to that. However, 
using an extreme as a base case is problematic  
too; the most obvious example being use of the 
highest age group from which it is not possible to 
gain any QALYs. The choice of a four-QALY gain 
arose to reflect a reasonable-sized gain and also to 
correspond with the four QALY gains which were 
offered to respondents in the matching study (see 
Chapter 5). 
 
In order to calculate the weights we compare 
our base case to an alternative scenario. We 
then vary the number of QALYs being offered 
in the alternative scenario until the estimated 
probability of choosing the base case equals 0.5 
(i.e. the individual is indifferent between the two 
scenarios). This is more easily demonstrated by 
using an example. We have our base case, AO = 40, 
AD = 60, QL = 0.7 and QALY = 4. We now take a 
scenario for which we want to find a weight, for 
example AO = 1, AD = 1 and QL = 1 (i.e. individuals 
fall ill and die at age 1), this being comparison 1 
in Table 7. We adjust the number of QALYs from 
treatment available to the comparison group until 
the probability of choosing the base case equals 0.5. 




where  exp(log(ui )) is the predicted utility for the 
ith choice from the powered model regression 
results in Table 6. In this case the probability of 
choosing the base case is 0.5 when the comparison 
group is offered 4.1 QALYs. The weight itself is 
found by taking the ratio of the QALYs offered in 








which in this case gives 4.1/4 = 1.025. This 
demonstrates that the base case is slightly preferred 
to the alternative, with one QALY to the base case 
being equal to 1.025 QALYs to the comparison. 
This process is repeated for each comparison 
scenario to generate weights. More generally, we 
try to illustrate this in Figure 12. Weights closer to 
0 show a stronger preference for the comparison, 
weights equal to 1 show indifference between 
the two groups and weights greater than 1 show 
preference for the base case. 
 
The weights from this procedure are given in 
Table 7. (In this table, the variables given earlier 
as percentages are now presented on a 0–1 scale 
in line with the more common representation in 
the QALY literature. Percentages were used earlier 
because that is how QoL was presented to survey 
respondents.) While these represent weights arising 
from assessing the respective comparator group 
against the base case, it is possible to generate 
weights for comparing different comparison 
groups. For example, if we wished to compare 
scenarios 5 and 8, we could do this indirectly 
by comparing the weights given in Table 7. The 
weight for comparison 5 is 0.79 and the weight 
for comparison 8 is 0.725 – from this we can 
conclude that scenario 8 is preferred to scenario 
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FIGURE 12 Preferences and weights in the discrete choice study. 
of 0.92 (0.725/0.79), which demonstrates that 0.92 








of a QALY to scenario 8 is worth one QALY to 
scenario 5. 
 
The weights presented in Table 7 are sometimes 
difficult to interpret because a number of factors 
vary at once when comparing scenarios. We can see 
that most weights are less than 1, suggesting that 
the comparison scenarios used here are generally 
preferred to the base case. The only exceptions are 
comparisons 1, 9, 11, 14 and 15 (and comparison 
12 which is the same as the base case). Apart from 
comparison 1, these scenarios are towards the top 
end of age at death and are quite severe. 
 
For those scenarios which are purely life 
saving, where age at onset equals age at death 
(comparisons 1, 6, 11 and 14), we see that there  
is a preference for those with an age at onset and 
age at death of 10 (comparison 6). The weight for 
this scenario is 0.62. The weights for the older 
groups (comparisons 11 and 14) are greater than 
1, indicating a preference for the base case. The 
weight for the youngest group (comparison 1) is 
also greater than 1, suggesting that individuals  
do not choose to treat those who are very young. 
These results suggest a non-linear relationship 
 
between age and weights, with the most preferred 
being the younger, but not youngest, groups. 
 
For severity we can see that, for the same age at 
onset and age at death, as QoL lost decreases, 
moving from 0.7 to 0.1, the weight moves towards 
0. The less severe comparisons (where QoL lost 
equals 0.1) have a weight of less than 1, showing 
that they are the preferred groups. This can be 
seen for comparisons 2 and 3, 4 and 5, 7 and 8, 9 
and 10, 12 and 13, and 15 and 16. 
 
It is difficult to make generalisations about age 
at onset and age at death using Table 7, where 
both variables often vary at the same time. An 
alternative approach to presenting the weights is 
to hold one of the factors constant and allow the 
others to vary. This is the approach used in Tables 8 
and 9. 
 
In Table 8, QoL lost is fixed at 0.7. This clearly 
shows that as age at onset increases the weights 
move towards 0 up to age 20 but then move 
towards 1. Weights for age at death move towards 
1 up to age 40, but then fall again. This shows 








Age at onset 
40 









     
1 1 1 1 4.1 1.025 
2 1 10 0.7 1.85 0.463 
3 1 10 0.1 1.52 0.38 
4 1 20 0.7 3.8 0.95 
5 1 20 0.1 3.16 0.79 
6 10 10 1 2.48 0.62 
7 10 20 0.7 3.5 0.875 
8 10 20 0.1 2.9 0.725 
9 10 40 0.7 4.6 1.15 
10 10 40 0.1 3.95 0.9875 
11 40 40 1 6.15 1.54 
12 40 60 0.7 4 1 
13 40 60 0.1 3.38 0.845 
14 70 70 1 6.45 1.61 
15 70 80 0.7 4.2 1.05 
16 70 80 0.1 3.55 0.89 













TABLE 8 Weights by age at onset and age at death 
 
 
Age at death 












1       
10 0.47      
20 0.95 0.87     
40 1.25 1.16 1.04    
60 1.09 1.00 0.90 1.00   
70 0.95 0.88 0.78 0.86 1.09  
80 0.80 0.74 0.65 0.73 0.93 1.05 
 
 
who fall ill at ages between 10 and 40 rather than 
the very old or the very young, and a preference 
for treating those who will die either very young 
or very old. In this, and similar tables to follow, 
blank cells are simply representative of unfeasible 
comparisons. 
 
In Table 9, age at death is fixed at 60 and the other 
attributes are allowed to vary. Again we can see that 
the weights for age at onset are quadratic, starting 
close to 1 for an age at onset of 1, moving towards 
0 up to age at onset of 20 before moving towards 1 
as age at onset increases further. For severity we can 
see a preference for treating those who are closer 
to the middle of the severity range. The weights 
 
health economics literature in the context of DCEs 
by Lancsar and Savage.58 
 
In general, the compensating variation (CV) is 
calculated by valuing in monetary terms the change 
in expected utility due to a policy change (e.g. 
change in price or quality of a good/service, or, in 
our study, a change in health state) as the change   
in income required to return the individual to their 
initial level of utility, that is, to compensate them 
for the change. 
 
The CV for discrete choice data takes the following 
form: 
are nearest 0 for a severity of 0.4 and closer to 1   
for severity scores of 0.1 (least severe) and 1 (most 
severe). 














V 1  







Another approach to calculating the relative 
weights attached to different types of QALYs, or 
beneficiaries of QALYs, is to use the Hicksian 
compensating variation approach to welfare 
measurement. The method for calculating the 
compensating variation using discrete data is due 
to Small and Rosen57 and was introduced to the 
where  V 
0   
and  V 
1   
are  the value of the indirect 
utility function for each choice option j before and 
after the policy change respectively; J is the number 
of options in the choice set; and  is the marginal 
utility of income, or its proxy. 
 
While a monetary value is the most convenient to 
turn the change in expected utility into a common 
metric, in fact any quantitative metric could be 
used as the numeraire. In the current study, instead 
 
 














0.1 0.925 0.850 0.750 0.840  
0.4 0.875 0.805 0.713 0.800  
0.7 1.088 1.000 0.900 1.000  
1     1.625 
 








of using income it is possible to calculate the CV for 
a move from one health state to another using the 
marginal utility of QALY gains as the numeraire. 
That is, we calculate the number of additional 
QALYs required to be given or taken away in the 
new health state to equalise the utility derived from 
the base and new health states. 
 
Like the probability-of-choice approach described 
previously, the CV approach can be used to value 
changes in, and create weights for, whole scenarios 
(i.e. entire health states). In addition, the CV can 
also be calculated to value and derive weights for 
individual characteristics such as age at onset, age 
at death and severity. To calculate both types of 
weights, we value changes from an initial health 
state, namely the same reference case as used in 
the calculation of the probability weights: AO = 40, 
AD = 60, QL = 0.7 and QALY = 4. 
 
From this initial health state we can calculate the 
CV, measured in numbers of QALYs, associated 
with a move to a new health state, described 
by new levels on the above attributes. This can 
involve an entire scenario or the valuation of each 
 
attribute one at a time. We use these CV measures 
to calculate weights for entire health states and 
for individual characteristics that describe the 
health states, by taking the ratio of the total QALYs 
required in the new health state to equalise utility 
and the original number of QALYs in the base 
model. This welfare theoretic approach also allows 
investigation of the strength of preference, as 
indicated by the magnitude of the CV. 
 
As with the probability-of-choice approach, the CV 
and relative weights reported in this section used 
the conditional logit results for the powered model 
reported in Table 6. The CV and relative weights 
for the entire health states described in Table 7 are 
reported in Table 10. In each of these, QALY gains 
are held constant at 4. 
 
Before discussing the results in Table 10, it is 
important to note that ‘QALY gain with treatment’ 
represents the number of QALYs in the health-state 
scenarios presented to respondents in the survey. 
This is not the same as the ‘QALY gain’ in the 
probability-of-choice tables, which is the result of 
the calculation of the number of QALYs required to 
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40 
 















      
1 1 1 1 4 0.0224 1.0056 
2 1 10 0.7 4 –0.5788 0.8553 
3 1 10 0.1 4 –0.7280 0.8180 
4 1 20 0.7 4 –0.0435 0.9891 
5 1 20 0.1 4 –0.1787 0.9553 
6 10 10 1 4 –0.3650 0.9087 
7 10 20 0.7 4 –0.1097 0.9726 
8 10 20 0.1 4 –0.2468 0.9383 
9 10 40 0.7 4 0.1190 1.0297 
10 10 40 0.1 4 –0.0112 0.9972 
11 40 40 1 4 0.3591 1.0898 
12 40 60 0.7 4 0 1 
13 40 60 0.1 4 –0.1339 0.9665 
14 70 70 1 4 0.4050 1.1013 
15 70 80 0.7 4 0.0390 1.0098 
16 70 80 0.1 4 –0.0937 0.9766 








equalise the probability of choosing the base case 
and alternative health states. 
 
Both the CV and weights are interpreted relative 
to the reference case. The same reference case is 
included as comparison 12, for which the CV is 
0, as would be expected since the health state has 
not changed, and the weight is 1. In Figure 13, 
relative to this base case, a negative CV indicates 
that the new state is preferred to the base case and 
that individuals are ‘willing to pay’ to secure the 
new health state – see for example, comparison 2. 
The consequent weight of 0.855 indicates that a 
QALY given in the base state is worth only 0.855 
of a QALY given in the new state. A positive CV 
indicates that individuals require  compensation 
(in terms of being given additional QALYs) in the 
new health state – see for example, comparison 1. 
A weight of greater than 1 indicates preference for 
the base state. 
 
For the four comparison health states that involve 
instant death without treatment (comparisons 
1, 6, 11 and 14) there is a preference for giving 
the QALYs to the base case, with the exception 
of comparison 6 which favours the alternative. 
This is in accordance with the underlying utility 
values derived from each health state. That is, the 
utility derived from the base case is greater than 
the utility derived from the alternatives with the 
exception of comparison 6 (a 10-year-old who dies 
instantly without treatment), which yields a higher 
utility than the base case. 
 
Still looking at the magnitude of the CV relative to 
the base case, respondents were willing to pay the 
largest amount (in terms of QALYs) for comparison 
3, namely a health state in which the individual 
becomes unwell at age 1, without treatment QoL 
drops by 90% and they die at age 10, whereas 
with treatment they gain four QALYs. The least 
preferred beneficiary of four QALYs is someone 
 
who becomes unwell at age 70 and without 
treatment dies instantly (comparison 14). 
 
Welfare measures and relative weights can also 
be calculated for the same complete health states 
described in Table 10, but where QALYs, in addition 
to the other attributes, are allowed to change 
between the initial and new health states. These 
results are presented in Table 11. 
 
Again, a weight greater (less) than 1 indicates a 
preference for the base (alternative) health state. 
Looking at these results in aggregate, the number 
of QALYs gained is driving the preference between 
the base and comparison health states. Without 
exception, for QALY gains in the new health state 
of 10, 15 and 30, the new health state is always 
preferred to the base (which only contains four 
QALYs). For all comparison health states involving 
only one QALY gain, the base case (containing 
four QALYs) is always preferred. For comparison 
health states with two QALY gains, the base case is 
generally preferred to the comparison case, except 
when those two QALYs are given to 1-year-olds 
whose QoL drops by 0.1 and who die at age 10, or 
1-year-olds whose QoL drops by 0.7 and who die at 
age 20. 
 
The CV and relative weights associated with the 
individual attributes (age at onset, age at death 
and severity) are reported in Table 12. These 
calculations used the same initial base health state 
of age at onset of 40, age at death of 60, QoL lost 
of 0.7 and four QALYs. The CV and weights per 
attribute level were calculated by changing one 
attribute at a time in the new health state, holding 
all else constant. 
 
Age at onset of 20 and 40 appear to be the most 
important, which could relate to considerations  
of the ages at which individuals are most 












FIGURE 13 Preferences and weights in the discrete choice study. 
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40 
 















      
1 1 1 1 1 0.8568 1.2142 
2 1 10 0.7 1 0.3853 1.0963 
3 1 10 0.1 1 0.2642 1.0660 
4 1 20 0.7 1 0.8065 1.2016 
5 1 20 0.1 1 0.7022 1.1756 
6 10 10 1 1 0.5561 1.1390 
7 10 20 0.7 1 0.7557 1.1889 
8 10 20 0.1 1 0.6491 1.1623 
9 10 40 0.7 1 0.9299 1.2325 
10 10 40 0.1 1 0.8312 1.2078 
11 40 40 1 1 1.1082 1.2771 
12 40 60 0.7 1 0.8398 1.2100 
13 40 60 0.1 1 0.7370 1.1842 
14 70 70 1 1 1.1417 1.2854 
15 70 80 0.7 1 0.8695 1.2174 
16 70 80 0.1 1 0.7680 1.1920 
17 1 1 1 2 0.4895 1.1224 
18 1 10 0.7 2 –0.0460 0.9885 
19 1 10 0.1 2 –0.1813 0.9547 
20 1 20 0.7 2 0.4316 1.1079 
21 1 20 0.1 2 0.3122 1.0780 
22 10 10 1 2 0.1462 1.0366 
23 10 20 0.7 2 0.3733 1.0933 
24 10 20 0.1 2 0.2517 1.0629 
25 10 40 0.7 2 0.5741 1.1435 
26 10 40 0.1 2 0.4601 1.1150 
27 40 40 1 2 0.7821 1.1955 
28 40 60 0.7 2 0.4699 1.1175 
29 40 60 0.1 2 0.3519 1.0880 
30 70 70 1 2 0.8215 1.2054 
31 70 80 0.7 2 0.5041 1.1260 
32 70 80 0.1 2 0.3874 1.0969 
33 1 1 1 10 –0.9594 0.7602 
34 1 10 0.7 10 –1.6568 0.5858 
35 1 10 0.1 10 –1.8256 0.5436 
36 1 20 0.7 10 –1.0374 0.7407 
37 1 20 0.1 10 –1.1961 0.7010 













Age at onset 
40 
 














39 10 20 0.7 10 –1.1153 0.7212 
40 10 20 0.1 10 –1.2754 0.6811 
41 10 40 0.7 10 –0.8442 0.7890 
42 10 40 0.1 10 –0.9992 0.7502 
43 40 40 1 10 –0.5535 0.8616 
44 40 60 0.7 10 –0.9859 0.7535 
45 40 60 0.1 10 –1.1437 0.7141 
46 70 70 1 10 –0.4971 0.8757 
47 1 1 1 15 –1.6162 0.5960 
48 1 10 0.7 15 –2.3566 0.4109 
49 1 10 0.1 15 –2.5338 0.3666 
50 1 20 0.7 15 –1.6997 0.5751 
51 1 20 0.1 15 –1.8691 0.5327 
52 10 10 1 15 –2.0985 0.4754 
53 10 20 0.7 15 –1.7829 0.5543 
54 10 20 0.1 15 –1.9535 0.5116 
55 10 40 0.7 15 –1.4924 0.6269 
56 10 40 0.1 15 –1.6588 0.5853 
57 40 40 1 15 –1.1777 0.7056 
58 40 60 0.7 15 –1.6446 0.5889 
59 40 60 0.1 15 –1.8132 0.5467 
60 1 1 1 30 –3.2013 0.1997 
61 1 10 0.7 30 –4.0036 –0.0009 
62 1 10 0.1 30 –4.1926 –0.0482 
63 1 20 0.7 30 –3.2930 0.1768 
64 1 20 0.1 30 –3.4780 0.1305 
65 10 10 1 30 –3.7265 0.0684 
66 10 20 0.7 30 –3.3840 0.1540 
67 10 20 0.1 30 –3.5696 0.1076 
68 10 40 0.7 30 –3.0648 0.2338 
69 10 40 0.1 30 –3.2481 0.1880 
70 40 40 1 30 –2.7139 0.3215 
71 40 60 0.7 30 –3.2325 0.1919 
72 40 60 0.1 30 –3.4171 0.1457 














TABLE 12 Compensating variations per attribute 
 
Attribute Level CV Weight 
Age at onset 1 0.0688 1.0172 
 10 0.0043 1.0011 
 20 –0.0862 0.9784 
 40 0 1 
 60 0.1741 1.0435 
 70 0.2675 1.0669 
Age at death 1 –0.3173 0.9207 
 10 –0.6568 0.8358 
 20 –0.1141 0.9715 
 40 0.1148 1.0287 
 60 0 1 
 70 –0.1108 0.9723 
 80 –0.2438 0.9390 
Severity (QoL loss) 1 0.2517 1.0629 
 0.7 0 1 
 0.4 –0.1730 0.9568 
 0.1 –0.1339 0.9665 




dependants), followed by the very young, with least 
importance given to the eldest two age groups of 
60- and 70-year-olds. Higher preference is given to 
those who die young (aged 10, 1 and 20). 
 
When interpreting the severity weights, we first 
note that the base case of QoL lost = 0.7 is one 
of the middle severity levels, so movements from 
this base case can represent an improvement in 
QoL (a loss of only 0.4 or 0.1 rather than 0.7 QoL) 
for which respondents were willing to pay or a 
detriment (QoL lost = 1) for which respondents 
required compensation. As movements from the 
base are in both directions, absolute values are 
used. Relative to the base case, again, more severe 
states are less preferred, as would be expected 
given the results reported above. In particular, 
moving from the base to the worst level of severity 
had the largest impact in terms of the CV; that 
is, respondents would have to be compensated 
a relatively large amount in absolute value for a 
health state that involved instant death. Willingness  
to pay (in terms of QALYs) to improve the initial 
level of severity – that is, to lose only 10% or 40%   
of QoL rather than the base case  of  70%  was 
similar across these two levels, producing similar 
weights (0.9567 and 0.9665 respectively). 
Further investigation of 
severity 
In the above regression analyses, the severity 
variable (QoL lost) appeared to behave in the 
opposite direction to how it had been weighted in 
previous studies. Although the relationship is close 
to being flat, this different result is nevertheless 
reflected to some extent in the regressions and in 
the weights presented in the previous section. This 
issue was, therefore, thought worthy of further 
investigation. In particular, the question to address 
is why QALYs gained by those who would otherwise 
die instantly (i.e. whose QoL lost would be 1) were 
not weighted higher than other types of QALY 
gain. 
 
To investigate this further, we isolated choice sets in 
which one scenario involved QoL lost being equal 
to 1 (i.e. age at onset = age at death), referred to 
here as the ‘life-saving’ option. By selecting choices 
with just one life-saving option, by definition, the 
comparator scenario within any such choice would 
be any of all other types (e.g. QoL enhancing only 
and L-shaped gains which enhance QoL, but also 
add years to life). This amounted to 1253 choice 








On 446 occasions, the life-saving option was 
chosen. On these occasions, the mean QALY gain 
being offered in the life-saving option was 12.8 
(median = 7) as opposed to a mean QALY gain of 
10.7 (median = 7.8) in the alternative (which was 
not chosen). The life-saving option, by definition, 
presents QoL lost as 1, and the mean QoL lost 
presented in the rejected scenario was 0.54. On 
these occasions it seems that, on average, QALY 
gains are larger and beneficiaries are more severe 
in life-saving options, so it is not surprising that 
this was chosen. 
 
On the 809 occasions when life saving was not 
chosen, the mean QALY gain being offered in 
the life-saving option was 5.43 (median = 4) as 
opposed to 13.4 (median = 7.9) in the alternative; 
the alternative having a mean QoL lost of 0.53. 
On these occasions it seems that, on average, 
QALY gains are much larger when beneficiaries 
are in a less severe state. This seems to have driven 
the choices made, making severity appear less 
important than it might be if choices were offered 
in which the scenarios were closer together in 
terms of numbers of QALYs gained. This may 
explain why results of matching-type studies, 
which essentially set QALYs equal and highlight 
differences in equity variables of interest (such as 
severity), tend to reveal more enhanced weights 
for such variables with beneficiaries in more severe 
states being more highly valued. An improved 
design might have meant that the interaction 
between QALYs and severity could have been 
allowed for more comfortably, which may have 
shown that the shape of the relationship between 
severity and utility was positive when treatment 
provides large QALY gains – a preference shown 
for the most severe – and negative when treatment 
provides small QALY gains – a preference for the 
least severe. That is, when small amounts of QALYs 
are being offered to someone who is already in a 
very bad state (or who will die imminently) it might 
seem reasonable not to place additional value or 
weight on that more severe state. Indeed, this is 
one interpretation of the results from one other 
study we are aware of, which provides a result 
that runs counter to the usual view of severity;59 
however, our data are not able to show this one 
way or the other. Other studies on severity, based 
on matching-style approaches, are discussed in 
Chapter 5, Concluding remarks. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The discrete choice part of the relativities study has 
exposed the reader to three things: the challenges 
 
of deriving relative weights for QALYs using 
discrete choice methods; two novel approaches 
to eliciting relative QALY weights from a discrete 
choice experiment; and some initial empirical 
weights. 
 
Overall, the estimated weights are similar 
across different regression models and different 
weighting procedures. There are obviously 
differences between the simple model and that 
including higher-order polynomials due to the 
imposed restriction of monotonicity in the former. 
Comparing the CV weights with those from the 
probability-of-choice approach, we can see that 
the range of weights is smaller (0.8–1.1) for the 
former, and that they are generally nearer to 1, 
suggesting no difference between the base case 
and the comparison scenario. More generally, 
this would indicate that age and severity have 
little impact on QALY gains. The range for the 
probability-of-choice approach is 0.38–1.61. As the 
weights are based on the same regression model, it 
is unsurprising that the same scenarios result in the 
lowest and highest weights in both methods. 
 
The narrow range of weights, especially using the 
CV approach, and the lack of statistical significance 
of age at onset and severity in the regression 
models, raise a number of issues. It might be that, 
when presenting information on such variables 
within a context in which health gains also vary, 
the impacts of age and severity are diminished. 
Indeed, this could be seen as an advantage of a 
discrete choice approach in which equity attributes 
are embedded within scenarios in which health 
gains (or QALYs) are also allowed to vary. However, 
it could also be the case that this result is driven 
by the compromises made necessary in the 
experimental design. 
 
There are some clear patterns. For example, as the 
age at onset increases, the weights move towards 0 
(until age 20) and then move towards 1. This shows 
a preference for those who fall ill between the ages 
of 10 and 40, with 20 being the most preferred. As 
age at death increases, the weights move towards 0 
(until age 10) and then move towards 1 (up to age 
40), before moving back towards 0. This shows a 
preference for individuals who will die at 1, 10 and 
80 and less of a preference for those between 20 
and 70. As severity increases, there is a preference 
for those who are slightly ill, a QoL loss of 0.4 and 
0.1, compared with those who lose 0.7 and 1. Of 
course, the advantage with these approaches is 
that it is possible that age effects outweigh severity 
effects, or vice versa, meaning that generalisations 
are harder to make unless we can invoke ceteris  







paribus assumptions. In other words, different 
weights on QALYs are required for a variety of 
contexts. 
 
With respect to more methodological issues, 
we have demonstrated two novel approaches 
to deriving weights from our empirical data. 
First, what issues arise from people’s perceived 
similarities or differences in the weights? At a 
conceptual level, the CV and probability-of-choice 
approaches to deriving relative weights are similar. 
However, instead of equalising the probability 
of choice between the two health states, the CV 
method equalises the utility associated with the two 
health states – a subtle but important difference. 
Second, does this difference matter? One 
possibility, of course, is that using the CV approach 
overcomes one limitation of the probability 
approach in that the CV can be used to calculate 
weights per attribute in addition to weight for 
entire health-state scenarios. 
 
The controversy of these results lies in the small 
impact of the equity variables of interest (age and 
severity). However, this should not necessarily be 





not desirable. In the short term, the results need to 
be reinforced by calculation of confidence intervals 
around the weights that have been presented. This 
is a significant task; hence such data have not been 
presented in this report. In addition, despite the 
controversial nature of this result, as mentioned 
above, it may have arisen due to one potential 
advantage of a discrete choice approach, whereby 
variations in equity attributes are considered 
alongside variations in health gains. Our main 
longer-term recommendation would, therefore, be 
for more research, as replication of such a result 
would be crucial prior to any subsequent policy 
recommendations. This research should also 
pursue alternative experimental design strategies  
in order to address the issue of implausible 
scenarios while still maintaining desirable design 
properties, so ensuring we can estimate the effects 
of interest with improved efficiency. Further 
important potential challenges, such as the nature 
of the (multiplicative) functional form used in 
the statistical analysis and the transformation of 
variables from the original forms in which they 
were presented in Table 6, are discussed further in 










We report here the ‘matching’ relativities study 
which, along with the DCE study (see Chapter 4), 
set out to determine whether the UK public wish to 
attach more weight to some QALYs than to others. 
To recap, a QALY is 1 year in full health and years 
spent in less than full health are ‘quality adjusted’ 
in order to take account of the morbidity associated 
with disability, disease or illness. As QALYs 
combine morbidity (QoL) and mortality (length of 
life) on a single scale, they allow comparisons to be 
made across interventions with different types of 
health outcomes (e.g. QoL enhancing versus life 
extending). In the standard ‘unweighted’ QALY 
model, all QALYs are of equal value. For example, 
the age of recipients does not matter, as long as 
the QALY gain is the same. Likewise, the standard 
model assumes that equal QALY gains are of equal 
value regardless of how severely ill the patients 
are prior to treatment. The aim of the matching – 
and DCE studies – is then to address the question 
of whether a QALY is a QALY is a QALY. Or put 
another way, is the ‘standard’ model correct? 
 
While each respondent in the survey answered a 
set of matching and discrete choice questions, we 
concentrate here on the results of the matching 
study, the main aims of which were: 
 
• to estimate the relative weights to be attached 
to a QALY according to the age of recipients 
• to estimate the relative weights to be attached 
to a QALY according to the severity of illness of 
recipients. 
 
The secondary aims of the matching study were 
to assess the impact of certain other attributes 
considered to be of interest to respondents and 
which featured in the design such as gain in life 




Briefly, ‘matching’ questions ask people to state the 
number of outcomes of one kind they consider to 
 
be ‘just as good as’ a specified number of outcomes 
of another kind. A typical matching question in this 
setting would be something along the following 
lines: 
 
Consider two groups of 100 people: 100 of type 
A and 100 of type B (these types being described 
and differentiated by age and severity of illness 
prior to treatment). With treatment, each of these 
types could experience some given health benefit. 
If there were only enough resources to treat one 
group, which would you prefer it to be? 
 
Suppose the respondent chooses to give priority  
to Group A. The number of beneficiaries in Group 
B is held fixed at 100 while the number of A-types 
is reduced to the point where  the  respondent 
finds it hard to prioritise between that number 
(X) of A-types and 100 B-types. By systematically 
varying the age and health of the people described   
in Groups A and B in a series of questions, it is 
possible to investigate the relative weights attached 
to health gains in people of  different  ages  and 
levels of health. 
 
The QALY grid approach 
Recall that the animated powerpoint introduction 
to the CAPI used a graph with QoL (from 0% to 
100%) on the vertical axis and Age (from 0 to 80) 
on the horizontal axis. Clearly, all questions posed 
in the relativities studies – both matching and 
DCE – must involve health gains that fall within 
this defined space. Further, all questions must 
be ‘logical’ in that there must be some positive 
gain in terms of either QoL or length of life, or 
both. While it was necessary to incorporate such 
considerations explicitly into the DCE design 
(the underlying principle of which is to allow 
all attributes to vary independently), ‘illogical’ 
scenarios were ruled out a priori in the matching 
design. There remain, however, an enormous 
number of potential pairings that can be made, 
and the challenge was to come up with the most 
parsimonious design that allowed all the research 
questions to be addressed. We were keen that 
the design be capable of testing the standard 









weights would be equal to one, as well as being able 
to detect systematic departures from this baseline 
assumption with respect to the age of patients and 
their ‘untreated’ QoL. To that end we developed 
the ‘QALY grid’ approach, summarised briefly 
below. 
 
Consider again the graph with QoL (from 0% to 
100%) on the vertical axis and Age (from 0 to 80) 
on the horizontal axis. By partitioning the vertical 
into five 20% ranges and dividing the horizontal 
into four 20-year intervals, we get 20 ‘cells’ 
(numbered 1–20 in Table 13). 
 
Improving a person’s health by any one cell, i.e. 
by 20% per year for 20 years, would, under the 
‘standard’ model, give four QALYs. But are all 
QALYs weighted equally, irrespective of where 
they are located in the grid? For example, suppose 
that type A people were those whose QoL would, 
if untreated, be 60% at (and after) age 20 and 
treatment could raise that QoL to 80% for the next 
20 years, whereas type B people would be at 80% 
from the age of 60 but could receive treatment that 
would restore them to 100% for the subsequent 
20 years. Both types would gain four ‘standard’ 
QALYs; but do respondents give both treatments 
equal priority? If not, which group of 100 do they 
give priority to? And if the number of beneficiaries 
in that group is reduced, at what value of X < 100 
do the two treatments receive equal priority? For 
example, if a respondent finds it hard to prioritise 
when the same total expenditure of resources could 
treat either 40 people of type A or 100 people of 
type B, that would suggest that such a respondent 
gives two-and-a-half times as much weight to a 
QALY in cell 14 as in cell 20. 
 
If we have data on respondents’ relative values for 
the 20 cells, and the value of a ‘reference’ cell is set 
equal to 1 (suppose we call that v
1
), we can derive 
 




) for the remaining 
19 cells in the grid. Our basic aim was to estimate 
these relative values. If each cell is paired with 









. This requires 31 pairings. An 
example of a question respondents were actually 
presented with in the matching study is reproduced 
in Figure 14. 
 
While this is a parsimonious design, extrapolating 
from these 31 ‘single cell’ questions requires a 
number of strong assumptions about the nature of 
respondents’ preferences; assumptions we did not 
feel able to make without first testing their validity. 
 
So another 41 questions in the overall design 
are intended to embody a number of such tests. 
Some of these questions look at blocks of cells: 
for example, each row P–T is paired with every 
adjacent row, and each column with every adjacent 
column. One important difference between the 
‘whole column’ and ‘single cell’ pairings is that 
the former necessarily involve ‘life-extending’ 
QALYs (as they offer an additional 20 years of life 
expectancy). For example, pairing cells 10 and 
11 asks respondents to consider an additional 
four QALYs (moving from 40% to 60% health for 
20 years) either between the ages of 20 and 40 or 
between the ages of 40 and 60. In contrast, pairing 
columns B and C asks respondents to consider 
extending life (at 100% health) for 20 years at the 
age of either 20 or 40. If respondents were to have 
preferences over ‘life-extending’, rather than ‘life- 
enhancing’ QALYs, we might expect the results of 
the questions involving the whole column to be 
somewhat different than implied by the ‘sum of 
the parts’, i.e. those pairings of the single cells that 
make up the columns. 
 
The design also allows us to test for consistency 




TABLE 13 The QALY grid 
 
QoL A B C D 
80–100% 17 18 19 20 P 
60–80% 13 14 15 16 Q 
40–60% 9 10 11 12 R 
20–40% 5 6 7 8 S 
0–20% 1 2 3 4 T 
Age 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80  
























). To test for 
chaining with different numbers of steps, we have 
built in some non-adjacent pairings. This has been 
done for single cells (e.g. compare the pairs {1, 2}, 
{2, 3} and {1, 3}), for whole columns, e.g. compare 
{A, B}, {B, C} and {A, C} and for whole rows, e.g. 
compare {R, S}, {S, T} and {R, T}. 
 
Finally, there are the tests for independence of 
the profile in which a cell appears. Consider the 
different ways in which cell 14 may appear in a 
scenario. In Figure 15, 14S shows the patient to 
be in good health until aged 20 when – without 
treatment – their QoL falls from 100% to 60% and 
they die at the age of 40. 
 
This depicts the ‘standard’ representation that 
applies to all other single cell comparisons used 
here. In 14X the patient is at 80% of good health 
until the age of 20, when their QoL falls to 60%, 
and again they die at the age of 40. In 14Z, the 
patient is at 80% of good health until the age of 20, 
when their QoL falls to 60%, but now they live until 
the age of 80. Finally, in 14Y the patient is in good 
health from birth and lives to the age of 80. Each 
profile test compares the ‘standard’ representation 
with one of the three other representations of 
that cell (i.e. 14S versus 14X, 14S versus 14Z, 14S 
versus 14Y). Three different sets of profile tests 
were carried out, involving cells 7, 11 and 14. ‘Fair 
innings’ type arguments would suggest a tendency, 
all else being equal, to favour those patients whose 
total lifetime QALYs were lower. 
 
For each of the three cells used in the profile tests, 
a ‘fair innings’ type argument would predict that 
 
more weight would be given to S than to Y (as the 
total lifetime QALYs is less in S than in Y), but 
S would be given less weight than X (as the total 
lifetime QALYs is greater in S than in X). Although 
not shown in detail here, S would be given less 
weight than Z in the cases of cells 7 and 11, but S 
would be given more weight than Z in the case of 
cell 14. 
 
The 72 questions were spread evenly across 12 
versions of the matching questionnaire, each 
respondent answering six matching questions 
(along with eight DCEs). 
 
Aggregating results 
Suppose the following represents data from five 
respondents who were indifferent between treating 
X patients in Group A and Y patients in Group B 
(with either X or Y = 100): 
 
Group A Group B 
X Y 
Resp 1 100 50 
Resp 2 100 90 
Resp 3 100 50 
Resp 4 50 100 
Resp 5 90 100 
This pattern indicates that respondents 1 to 3 
preferred to give priority to Group B at the first 
matching iteration, i.e. when there were 100 in 
each group, and subsequently set the number 
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than 100. In contrast, respondents 4 and 5 
preferred to give priority to Group A initially, 
and subsequently set the number  treated  in 
that group (X) at some number lower than 100. 
Clearly, respondents 3 and 4 have identical, but 
opposite, preferences. Yet, the ratio X/Y is 2:1 for 
respondent 3 and 0.5:1 for respondent 4 (and vice 
versa for Y/X) resulting in a very different effect 
on the arithmetic mean of individual ratios. As the 
decision to take the ratio X/Y or Y/X is arbitrary, 
this asymmetry is an undesirable property of an 
aggregation method. 
 
There are two ways in which we shall aggregate 
the results of the matching questions in order to 
overcome problems due to lack of symmetry. The 
first of these – the ratio of means method – is the 
method used previously in work commissioned 
for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which 
set out to investigate whether premia ought to 
be attached to the prevention of certain types of 
deaths.60 
 
The ratio of means method 
In this method the most favoured group attracts 
a value of 1 and the less favoured a value equal 
to the number of patients treated in the more 
preferred group divided by the number treated  
in the less preferred group. For example, Group 
B was respondent 1’s ‘most preferred’ group and 
they set Y at 50. Group B then attracts a value of 1 
and Group A a value equal to Y/X = 0.5. Following 
this principle for all five respondents yields the 
following values: 
 
Group A Group B 
Resp 1 0.5 1 
Resp 2 0.9 1 
Resp 3 0.5 1 
Resp 4 1 0.5 
Resp 5 1 0.9 
Means of each column are then taken and the ratio 
of those means are calculated. In this case, the 
mean value for Group A is 0.78 while the mean 
value for Group B is 0.88. The implied weight of 
Group B relative to Group A is then 0.88/0.78 = 
1.13. Alternatively, the implied weight of Group 
A relative to Group B is 1/1.13 = 0.88, i.e. the 







Aggregating ratios derived from 
individual responses 
Alternatively, the ratios X/Y may be computed for 
each individual respondent and then the median 
can be identified. The ratios are as follows: 
 
X/Y 
Resp 1 2:1 
Resp 2 1.11:1 
Resp 3 2:1 
Resp 4 0.5:1 
Resp 5 0.9:1 
 
Taking medians of the individual ratios results 
in a weight of Group A relative to Group B of 
approximately 1.11. As with the ratio of means 
method above, this measure is symmetrical, i.e. the 
median of the Y/X ratios is 1/1.11 = 0.9. 
 
In this particular example, both measures produce 
very similar measures of central tendency. However, 




Responses to first matching 
question 
Before going on to look at the weights derived 
from the aggregate matching data, we begin by 
looking at the number of respondents choosing 
to give priority to one group or the other in the 
first matching iteration, i.e. when the number of 
patients treated was 100 in both groups. These data 
are the most straightforward to interpret and are 
arguably the simplest way of illustrating the general 
patterns to emerge from the relativities study. 
 
With regard to the general pattern relating to age, 
a total of 269 respondents answered a matching 
question involving an equivalent gain going  
either to 40- to 60-year-olds or to 60- to 80-year- 
olds. Of these 269, 173 (64%) preferred to give 
priority to the younger patients. Similarly, a total 
of 294 respondents answered a matching question 
involving an equivalent gain going either to 20- to 
40-year-olds or to 40- to 60-year-olds. Of the 294, 
182 (62%) preferred to give priority to the younger 
patients. In contrast, a total of 295 respondents 
answered a matching question involving an 
equivalent gain going either to 0- to 20-year-olds 
or to 20- to 40-year-olds. Of the 295, only 107 
(36%) preferred to give priority to the younger 
patients. This suggested that the pattern relating   
to age is not a simple one and that ‘non-linearities’ 
may exist with respect to age weights. 
 
This pattern is borne out if we look only at 
responses to the whole column questions (detailed 
above) which involved gains of 20 QALYs that were 
necessarily life extending. Of the 51 respondents 
who were asked to compare column A (20 years in 
full health for a newborn) with column B (20 years 
in full health for a 20-year-old), 17 (33.3%) 
preferred to treat the younger patients. In contrast, 
of the 54 respondents who compared column 
C (20 years in full health for 40-year-olds) with 
column D (20 years in full health for 60-year-olds), 
36 (66.7%) preferred to treat the younger patients. 
 
With regard to the general pattern relating to 
severity, a total of 294 respondents answered 
a matching question involving a move either 
from 60% to 80% health or from 80% to 100% 
health (for a given age group). Of the 294, 170 
(58%) preferred to give priority to patients in the 
more severe health state. In contrast, of the 280 
respondents who answered a matching question 
involving a move either from 0% to 20% health or 
from 20% to 40% health (for a given age group), 
only 105 (38%) preferred to give priority to those 
patients in the more severe health state. Again, 
observing these initial choices suggested that 
non-linearities may exist with respect to severity 
weights. The pattern is borne out by observing 
responses to the ‘whole row’ questions. Of the 44 
respondents who were asked to compare row T (a 
move from 0% health to 20% health between birth 
and age 80) and row S (a move from 20% health to 
40% health between birth and aged 80), 17 (38.6%) 
preferred to treat those patients who were worse 
off initially. In contrast, of the 44 respondents who 
were asked to compare row Q and row P, 32 (71.1%) 
preferred to treat those patients who were worse off 
initially. 
 
As it seemed plausible that the desire to prioritise 
one age group over another may be related to the 
age of respondents, we also broke these data down 
by age of respondent. The sample was divided 
into three broad age groups: the under 40-year- 
olds, the 40- to 60-year-olds and the over 60-year- 
olds. These categories were chosen as they best 
coincided with those used in the QALY grid (as 
respondents had to be 18 or over to participate in 
the survey, there are too few respondents to have a 
separate category for 0- to 20-year-olds). In Tables 








TABLE 14 Preferences for treating 0- to 20-year-olds over 20- to 40-year-olds by respondent age 
 
 
Age of respondent 
Preference given to 
0- to 20-year-olds 
Preference given to 
20- to 40-year-olds 
 
n 
Under 40 48 (49%) 51 (51%) 99 
40–60 35 (34%) 67 (66%) 102 
Over 60 24 (26%) 70 (74%) 94 
Total 107 188 295 
2(2) = 11.79; p = 0.003. 
 
TABLE 15 Preferences for treating 40- to 60-year-olds over 60- to 80-year-olds by respondent age 
 
 
Age of respondent 
Preference given to 
40- to 60-year-olds 
Preference given to 
60- to 80-year-olds 
 
n 
Under 40 60 (68%) 21 (32%) 81 
40– 60 65 (61%) 30 (39%) 95 
Over 60 48 (49%) 45 (51%) 93 
Total 173 96 269 
2(2) = 7.65; p = 0.022. 
 
 
respondents preferring to treat one group over 
the other at the initial iteration in the matching 
question, i.e. when there were 100 patients in 
both groups. The numbers in brackets relate to 
the percentage of respondents in each age group 
preferring to treat that group over the other. In 
each case, differences across age groups have been 
tested using chi-squared tests with two degrees of 
freedom. 
 
Thus, it does appear as if responses are significantly 
different according to age of respondent. The 
general pattern to emerge from the data (including 
some not shown here) is that older respondents 
seem more inclined than younger respondents to 
give preference to older patients, but this does not 
appear to be related just to a self-interested desire 
to prioritise their own age group (as they are also 
more likely to give preference to 20- to 40-year-olds 
than to 0- to 20-year-olds). 
 
As it also seemed plausible that a desire to 
prioritise in terms of severity may also be related 
to respondent age, we broke down the data 
relating to severity in this way. In Tables 16 and 17 
the numbers in the cells represent respondents 
preferring to treat one group over the other, now 
defined by severity of health state (and holding age 
of patients constant). 
Again, it does appear as if responses are 
significantly different according to age of 
respondent. In particular, Table 17 shows that older 
respondents are more likely to favour that group  
in better health initially when the gains take place 
towards the top of the severity spectrum. This may 
reflect the fact that older respondents place greater 
weight on returning patients to full health than 
their younger counterparts. 
 
While observing that these first choices is a useful 
means of illustrating the general patterns to emerge 
from the data, we go on to look at the aggregate 
results from the iterative matching procedures that 
followed. 
 
The relative weights 
Recall that our ‘QALY grid’ partitions the vertical 
axis of Figure 14 into five 20% ranges and the 
horizontal axis into four 20-year intervals, giving 
20 ‘cells’, each worth four QALYs under the 
‘standard’ model. We then set out to determine 
whether all QALYs were weighted equally, 
irrespective of where they are located in the grid. 
We begin by presenting the results of the 31 
single cell comparisons and the ratio of means 
aggregation method. The implications of using 












Age of respondent 
Preference given to gain from 
0% to 20% 
Preference given to gain from 
20% to 40% 
 
n 
Under 40 38 (46%) 45 (54%) 83 
40–60 28 (28%) 73 (72%) 101 
Over 60 39 (41%) 57 (59%) 96 
Total 105 175 280 
2(2) = 7.30; p = 0.026. 
 




Age of respondent 
Preference given to gain from 
60% to 80% 
Preference given to gain from 
80% to 100% 
 
n 
Under 40 43 (68%) 20 (32%) 63 
40–60 75 (61%) 49 (39%) 124 
Over 60 52 (49%) 55 (51%) 107 
Total 170 124 294 
2(2) = 7.30; p = 0.026. 
 
TABLE 18 Horizontal (age) weights: ratio of means method (cell numbers are shown in square brackets)  
 
QoL 
80–100% [17] 0.837 [18] 1.559 [19] 1.834 [20]  N/A 
60–80% [13] 0.781 [14] 1.131 [15] 1.564 [16]  N/A 
40–60% [9] 0.676 [10] 1.039 [11] 1.383 [12]  N/A 
20–40% [5] 0.716 [6] 1.298 [7] 1.433 [8]  N/A 
0–20% [1] 0.867 [2] 1.228 [3] 1.687 [4]  N/A 
Age 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 
N/A, not applicable; QoL, quality of life. 
 
 
The numbers in each cell of Table 18 signify the 
weight attached to that cell relative to the cell to  
the right, as derived via the method set out under 
‘Aggregating results’. Values greater than 1 indicate 
that more weight is attached to that cell than to the 
one to the right. Values less than 1 indicate that less 
weight is attached to that cell than to the one to 
the right. For example, a value of 1.564 in cell 15 
indicates that a gain (in this case from 60% to 80% 
health) accruing to 40- to 60-year-olds is valued at 
1.564 times the equivalent gain accruing to 60- to 
80-year-olds. In contrast, the value of 0.676 in cell 
9 indicates that a gain (in this case from 40% to 
60% health) accruing to 0- to 20-year-olds is worth 
 
0.676 times the equivalent gain accruing to 20- to 
40-year-olds. 
 
Following this through for all other adjacent 
horizontal cell comparisons, the general pattern 
to emerge with respect to age (holding severity 
constant) is as follows: 
 
• Less weight is given to treating 0- to 20-year- 
olds than 20- to 40-year-olds. 
• More weight is given to treating 20- to 40-year- 
olds than 40- to 60-year-olds. 
• More weight is given to treating 40- to 60-year- 








TABLE 19 Vertical (severity) weights: ratio of means method (cell numbers are shown in square brackets)  
 
QoL 
80–100% [17]  N/A [18]  N/A [19]  N/A [20]  N/A 
60–80% [13] 1.064 [14] 1.369 [15] 1.203 [16] 1.618 
40–60% [9] 0.792 [10] 1.144 [11] 1.179 [12] 1.247 
20–40% [5] 0.955 [6] 1.185 [7] 1.235 [8] 1.247 
0–20% [1] 0.786 [2] 0.759 [3] 0.857 [4] 0.801 
Age 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 
N/A, not applicable; QoL, quality of life. 
 
 
Though not shown in detail here, this broad 
pattern is borne out in the ‘whole column’ 
comparisons, indicating that this pattern holds for 
life-extending QALYs involving larger gains too. 
 
Turning now to the vertical – or severity – weights, 
the numbers in each cell of Table 19 signify the 
weight attached to that cell relative to the cell 
above it. Values greater than 1 indicate that more 
weight is attached to that cell than to the one above 
it and vice versa. For example, a value of 1.618 in 
cell 16 indicates that, for a given patient age group, 
a gain from 60% health to 80% health is valued 
at 1.618 times that from 80% to 100% health. In 
contrast, a value of 0.801 in cell 4 indicates that 
a gain from 0% to 20% health is valued at 0.801 
times that from 20% to 40% health (again keeping 
age of patient constant). 
 
The general pattern to emerge with respect to 
severity (holding age constant) is as follows: 
 
• Less weight is given to a move from 0% to 20% 
than from 20% to 40%. 
• More weight is given to a move from 20% to 
40% than from 40% to 60%. 
 
• More weight is given to a move from 40% to 
60% than from 60% to 80%. 
• More weight is given to a move from 60% to 
80% than from 80% to 100%. 
 
(The exception to this pattern is the  0–20  age 
range, where a move from 60% to 80% is weighted 
most highly and where the weights drop away 
progressively above and below that cell.) 
 
Given the broad regularity of the patterns for 
both age and severity – in both cases, the general 
shape is a (somewhat off-centre) inverted U – one 
simple way of combining the two into a single set of 
weights for the 20 cells is as follows: 
 
1. Identify the average pattern showing how 
weights vary just with age, independent of 
severity. 
2. Likewise, identify the average pattern 
showing how weights vary just with severity, 
independent of age. 
3. Compute the weight for any cell as the cross- 
product of the appropriate age and severity 
weights, normalising overall so that the most 
highly weighted cell is indexed at 1. 
 
 
TABLE 20 Horizontal (age) weights inferred from Table 18 (cell numbers are shown in square brackets) 
 
QoL 
80–100% [17] 0.837 [18] 1.000 [19] 0.641 [20] 0.350 
60–80% [13] 0.781 [14] 1.000 [15] 0.884 [16] 0.565 
40–60% [9] 0.676 [10] 1.000 [11] 0.962 [12] 0.697 
20–40% [5] 0.716 [6] 1.000 [7] 0.770 [8] 0.538 
0–20% [1] 0.867 [2] 1.000 [3] 0.814 [4] 0.483 
Age 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 
Average for each age 0.775 1.000 0.814 0.527 
range     








One way of achieving that result is as follows. It is 
clear from Table 18 that at every level of severity the 
20–40 age range is most highly weighted, so assign 
those cells an ‘age weight’ of 1 and use the ratios 
reported in Table 18 to infer relative weights for the 
other cells on each row. The result is reported in 
Table 20. The average weights for each age range 
are shown in the bottom row. 
 
Likewise, noting that the highest weight on the 
severity axis for three of the four age ranges is 
accorded to a move from 20% to 40%, we can 
 
assign weights of 1 to those cells and infer relative 
weights for the other cells in each column (Table 
21). Then the average for each severity level can be 
calculated; this is shown in the last column. 
 
Taking the cross-product of the average weights for 
age and severity gives Table 22. 
 
Table 22 gives the estimated weight of each cell 
relative to the cell with the highest value – cell 6, 
where a gain from 20% to 40% health accrues to 
20- to 40-year-olds. The general pattern is that the 
 
 




    Average for 
each severity 
80–100% [17] 1.243 [18] 0.539 [19] 0.571 [20] 0.397 0.688 
60–80% [13] 1.322 [14] 0.738 [15] 0.687 [16] 0.643 0.848 
40–60% [9] 1.047 [10] 0.844 [11] 0.810 [12] 0.802 0.876 
20–40% [5] 1.000 [6] 1.000 [7] 1.000 [8] 1.000 1.000 
0–20% [1] 0.786 [2] 0.759 [3] 0.857 [4] 0.801 0.791 
Age 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80  
QoL, quality of life. 
 
TABLE 22 Implied relative weights: ratio of means method (cell numbers are shown in square brackets) 
 
QoL 
80–100% [17] 0.533 [18] 0.688 [19] 0.560 [20] 0.362 
60–80% [13] 0.658 [14] 0.848 [15] 0.690 [16] 0.446 
40–60% [9] 0.679 [10] 0.876 [11] 0.713 [12] 0.461 
20–40% [5] 0.775 [6] 1.000 [7] 0.844 [8] 0.527 
0–20% [1] 0.613 [2] 0.791 [3] 0.644 [4] 0.417 
Age 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 
QoL, quality of life. 
 
TABLE 23 Implied relative weights: median of individual ratios method (cell numbers are shown in square brackets)  
 
QoL 
80–100% [17] 0.47 [18] 0.72 [19] 0.54 [20] 0.24 
60–80% [13] 0.55 [14] 0.85 [15] 0.64 [16] 0.29 
40–60% [9] 0.60 [10] 0.92 [11] 0.69 [12] 0.31 
20–40% [5] 0.65 [6] 1.00 [7] 0.75 [8] 0.34 
0–20% [1] 0.49 [2] 0.75 [3] 0.56 [4] 0.26 
Age 0–20 20–40 40–60 60–80 









valuation function peaks at cell 6, but then ‘falls 
away’ in all directions. As the top right-hand corner 
cell combines the lowest average weight assigned 
to severity with the lowest average weight assigned 
to age, it carries the lowest weight of any cell; on 
this basis, the differential between the highest and 
lowest valued cells is roughly 2.75:1. 
 
As noted under ‘Aggregating results’, the ratio of 
means method is one method of aggregating the 
matching data. However, another set of weights 
can be produced on the basis of medians. The 
method of construction is essentially the same: the 
median ratios between rows and between columns 
allow us to fix the weight of cell 6 at 1, and set 
the weights for all other cells in the same row and 
column as cell 6, on the basis of those medians; the 
weights in all other cells are then computed as the 
appropriate cross-products. The results are given in 
Table 23. 
 
Not surprisingly, weights based on means do not 
exactly coincide with the median-based measures. 
The averaging process appears to make the slope 
away from the ‘peak’ weight less steep in nearly 
all directions, so that the median-based weights 
are somewhat lower in most cases: while the most 
extreme comparison from Table 22 is 2.75:1, the 
corresponding ratio in Table 23 is approximately 
4:1. However, although the specific weights may 
vary according to the measure of central tendency 
chosen and the particular method of aggregation, 
the general pattern of weights dropping as we 




As outlined in the methods sections, a number of 
non-adjacent pairings were carried out in order 
to test for chaining with different numbers of 













). In Table 24, the 
 
TABLE 24 Results of ‘chaining’ tests 
 
‘direct’ column reports actual responses to the 




) in the example 
used here, while the values in the ‘chained’ column 
are derived by multiplying together the weights of 









) in the example used here. Chaining tests were 
also carried out for whole columns, e.g. compare 
{A, B}, {B, C} and {A, C} and for whole rows, e.g. 
compare {R, Q}, {Q, P} and {R, P}. In each case 
the values relate to the aggregate matching results 
and make use of the ratio of means aggregation 
method. 
 
For each of the non-adjacent pairings in the 
chaining tests we can see that the value implied 
by ‘chaining’ is more extreme than that derived 



























) = 2.12. 
Profile tests 
Finally, we turn to the tests for independence of the 
profile in which a cell appears. Recall that Figure 15 
illustrated the alternative ways in which we might 
have presented the QALY gains embodied in the 
cells in the QALY grid. Profile tests were carried 
out on three different cells: 7, 11 and 14. We have 
argued that a ‘fair innings’ type argument – in 
which the total lifetime QALYs was relevant – would 
always predict that more weight would be given to 
the ‘standard’ profile (S) than to profile Y (as the 
total lifetime QALYs is less in S than in Y), and less 
weight to profile S than profile X. Finally, profile 
S would be given less weight than Z in the cases of 
cells 7 and 11, but S would be given more weight 
than Z in the case of cell 14. 
 
The results are given in Table 25 where values 
greater than 1 indicate that the gain was valued 
more highly when embedded in the profile S than 
in the alternative and vice versa. For example, 
the first column of Table 25 gives the results of 
comparing the profile S with profile X (see Figure 
15). As the values are each greater than 1, there 
appears, if anything, to be a tendency to favour 
 
 
TABLE 25 Results of the ‘profile’ tests 
Direct Chained 
9 vs 17 0.92 0.84 
11 vs 19 1.18 1.42 
10 vs 12 1.38 1.44 
18 vs 20 2.12 2.85 
6 vs 8 1.83 1.86 
A vs C 0.93 0.71 
R vs P 1.91 2.46 
 
S vs X S vs Y S vs Z 
Cell 7 1.33 0.74 1.24 
Cell 11 1.22 1.36 1.08 









those with higher lifetime health, which is the 
opposite of what a ‘fair innings’ argument would 
suggest. Column 2 shows that for two of the three 
cells (7 and 14) the standard profile was valued 
less highly than profile Y, which had lower lifetime 
health – a finding which does fit with a ‘fair 
innings’ type argument – but that the opposite  
was true in the case of cell 11. The results of the S 
versus Z comparison also appear to contradict the 
‘fair innings’ argument. 
 
To sum up, it is difficult to detect any clear pattern 
in responses to the profile tests conducted here, 
but, if anything, the data appear to contradict the 
‘fair innings’ argument, which is puzzling. 
 
Concluding remarks 
We  reported here the results of a computer- 
assisted ‘matching’, or person trade-off, valuation 
study carried out in a sample of 587 members of 
the public in the UK. The results showed that, 
when asked questions of the type posed here, 
respondents do differentiate between ‘types’ of 
QALYs and are willing to trade off (sometimes 
considerable) numbers of patients treated in order 
to prioritise according to age and severity of illness. 
The matching data show a general tendency to give 
more weight to younger patients and to those in 
poorer health, but the pattern is not a simple one.  
In particular, less weight is given to the youngest 
patients and to those in poorest health, reversing 
the pattern found elsewhere in the data. As these 
patterns may be observed in the simple choice data 
from the first matching iteration (when there were 
100 patients in each group), they are robust to 
differences in methods used to aggregate the data. 
 
The qualitative findings reported in Chapter 3 
may offer some explanation for the pattern of 
results uncovered here. Recall that age was found 
to be important to focus group participants for a 
variety of reasons including life expectancy, which 
would explain the general tendency to favour the 
young over the old. Recall also, however, that age 
was found to be used as a ‘proxy’ for a range of 
other characteristics including economic activity 
and the existence of dependants. One possible 
explanation for the tendency to favour 20- to 
40-year-olds over younger patients, therefore, is 
that such considerations outweigh the impact of  
life expectancy around those ages. If we were to 
represent the 20 discrete choice weights with the 20 
cells of the QALY grid, the peak (most preferred 
cell) would be cell 14. This is consistent with the 
 
most preferred age group from the matching data 
(20–40), but implies that less-severe states are 
preferred (60% to 80%), although the magnitude of 
the weights is obviously very different. 
 
Returning specifically to the matching data, it 
is also reported in Chapter 3 that respondents 
expressed the view that an improvement in QoL  
for people in poor health would be more important 
than an identical improvement in QoL for people  
in relatively good health. Again, this would seem to 
be consistent with the general tendency to favour 
those in more severe health states initially. Some 
concern was also expressed that prolonging life 
in a really bad health state was not desirable. One 
possible explanation for why respondents favoured 
a move from 20% to 40% health over one from 
0% to 20% is that 20% was still considered to be 
not worth living. Indeed, one of the respondents 
quoted in Chapter 3 almost makes this point 
explicitly: ‘whereas 20% is pretty close to death.’ 
This raises issues about how the QoL axis – which 
necessarily relied on a ‘visual analogue scale (VAS)- 
like’ representation in order to put the concept 
across to respondents – was being interpreted, 
particularly towards the lower end. 
 
It is also possible that the tendency for the 
weights to ‘dip’ towards the top right-hand corner 
of the grid may be linked to how respondents 
were interpreting the QoL scale. While the 
diagrammatic representation of QoL over the 
patient’s lifetime made it clear that the QoL related 
to the relevant stage of the patient’s life, such that 
100% health at the age of 70 meant in good health 
for a 70-year-old, it may be that certain respondents 
were considering QoL as an absolute measure. If this 
were the case, then it might have been considered 
that 80% health, for example, was the best that 
old people could reasonably expect to achieve and 
little was to be achieved by trying to improve their 
health beyond this. If there were a certain degree of 
this going on when respondents were answering the 
matching questions, this raises the possibility that 
the weights estimated here are perhaps penalising 
the ‘healthy old’ rather too heavily. 
 
While the general pattern of weights estimated for 
the QALY grid is robust to the different methods 
of aggregating the data, clearly the magnitude of 
the weights differs markedly. The ratio of means 
method of aggregating the data is the more 
conservative of the two methods deployed here and 
has been used to derive relative weights elsewhere 
in the economy.60 It is important to acknowledge, 









of other methods of aggregating the data. It is not 
our intention to go into these issues further here  
as decisions regarding the appropriate magnitude 
of any weights used for policy purposes will clearly 
be guided by additional considerations, such as 
acceptability and practicality. 
 
We conclude this section by comparing how the 
magnitude of the weights estimated here compares 
with those reported in previous studies. The review 
paper by Dolan and colleagues16 cites a number of 
studies that have set out to estimate age-weights 
for life-years gained that have come up with a 
range of values. For example, Johannesson and 
Johanesson61 report weights for life-years gained  
at ages 30, 50 and 70 years of 1.0, 0.22 and 0.1 
respectively, indicating a 10:1 differential between 
the most preferred and least preferred age 
groups. Adjusting for QoL affected these estimates 
somewhat, with three QALYs gained for a 50-year- 
old or nine QALYs gained for a 70-year-old judged 
equivalent to one QALY gained for a 30-year-old. 
Similarly, Nord and colleagues11 derived weights 
for life-years gained at ages 10, 20, 60 and 80 of 
1.1, 1.0, 0.4 and 0.1 respectively, again indicating 
a more than 10:1 differential between the most 
preferred and least preferred age groups. This 
pattern was very similar when life-improving, 
rather than life- extending, interventions were 
considered. Finally, Busschbach and colleagues62 
 
compared QoL improvements at ages 5, 10, 35,  
60 and 70 and estimated weights for the utility of 
health at these ages to be 0.2, 1.5, 1.0, 0.7 and 0.7 
respectively, indicating a 7.5:1 differential between 
the most preferred and least preferred age groups. 
It is interesting to note that these weights are more 
extreme than even the less conservative of our two 
methods of aggregating the data. 
 
In addition, a number of studies have looked at the 
impact of severity of health state and found it to be 
an important factor, although the results are mixed. 
Nord and colleagues11 and Ubel and colleagues63 
asked subjects to compare improvements on a 
disability scale (where lower numbers indicate 
better functioning) with approximately equal 
distances between the levels. Respondents were 
asked to indicate how many patients moving 
from level 5 to level 1 was equivalent to moving 
a smaller number of patients from level 6 to level 
4. Both studies reported a marked preference for 
treating the more severely ill patients. In contrast, 
a recent study by Dolan and Tsuchiya64 found that 
respondents gave consistently higher priority to 
patients with better prospects without treatment, 
indicating that the more severely ill attract lower 
priority than the better off, a finding which remains 
unexplained and is perhaps more in line with the 





Exploring the feasibility of 




Other Government departments/agencies, e.g. the 
Department for Transport (DfT), the Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 
and the HSE, have drawn on the stated preferences 
of representative cross-sections of the population to 
assign monetary values to the prevention of injury, 
illness and premature death. If it were possible to 
obtain a comparable preference-based monetary 
value for a QALY, this would offer the prospect of 
being able to apply cost–benefit analysis to an even 
broader range of public health and safety policies 
in a more coherent and consistent manner – and in 
a way which better reflects the values of the people 
who are paying for, and benefiting from, those 
policies. 
 
So the objective of this part of the study was to 
explore the feasibility of eliciting such a value and, 
in the process, raise and address the theoretical 
and practical issues involved in trying to do so. 
 
As a starting point, consider the way that 
preference-based monetary values have been 
estimated for use in road safety appraisal. Typically, 
surveys have sought to elicit the maximum 
amounts that respondents would individually be 
willing to pay for (usually small) reductions in their 
own (and possibly others’) risk of being killed or 
injured in road accidents. These amounts are then 
aggregated across individuals to arrive at an overall 
value for the safety improvement concerned. The 
resultant figure thus aims to show what the safety 
improvement is ‘worth’ to the affected group, 
relative to the alternative ways in which that group 
might have spent its money. 
 
For example, suppose that the members of a 
representative sample of the population were each 
asked for their WTP to reduce their risk of death 
on the roads during the next year by 1 in 100,000. 
If the mean response were £12, the implication 
would be that 100,000 members of the population 
would, between them, be willing to pay a total of 
£1.2M to achieve an overall reduction in risk that 
would, on average, reduce the number of fatalities 
on the roads by 1. Hence, the preference-based 
 
component of the value of preventing a (statistical) 
fatality (VPF) would be set at £1.2M. [While this 
is the largest element in the overall VPF, it is not 
the only one: it is usually supplemented by figures 
which represent the loss of net consumption 
entailed by premature death and some estimate of 
the costs (medical, police, etc.) of dealing with the 
consequences of a typical fatal accident.] 
 
A similar approach could be envisaged for 
estimating a societal WTP-based monetary value of 
a QALY. The simplest case would be if people had 
a clear idea of what a QALY is, and could then be 
asked for their WTP to reduce the risk of suffering 
the loss of 1 QALY by 1 in 1000 (for example). If a 
representative sample stated a mean WTP of, say, 
£18 for such a risk reduction, the implication would 
be that 1000 members of the population would, 
between them, be willing to pay a total of £18,000 
for some intervention that would, on average, 
prevent the loss of one QALY. 
 
Other closely-related variants are possible. For 
example, each respondent could be asked to 
imagine that they face a 1 in 1000 risk of an illness 
which, if untreated (or treated conventionally), 
would entail the loss of one QALY. They could then 
be offered an ‘insurance policy’ which would ensure 
that they received treatment (or  treatment  over 
and above the conventional provision) that would 
restore them to their current/normal health and 
avoid that QALY loss. Again, if the average WTP 
for this insurance were £18, the aggregate value of 
the treatment that generates a one-QALY benefit 
would be £18,000. 
 
That is the basic principle. In the remainder of this 
part of the report, we describe how we explored 
different ways of trying to put that principle into 
practice, and we discuss the issues raised both by 
the process and by the responses elicited. 
 
Overview of the 
questionnaire 
In practice, very few members of the public know 
what a QALY is. One possibility might have been  







to begin any interview by trying to explain the 
concept in a general way (as was attempted in 
the ‘relativities’ part of the project) and then ask 
individuals to think about how they would envisage 
personal QALY gains or losses and how much they 
would be willing to pay to achieve such gains or 
avoid such losses. 
 
We do not rule this out as one possible way of 
proceeding; indeed, in the ‘relativities’ study 
there appeared to be a reasonable degree of 
receptiveness for the initial broad explanation of 
what QALYs are. However, such an explanation 
would have required quite a lot of time – 
especially if supplemented by some attempt to 
get respondents to relate the concept to their   
own present and future lives – and our focus was 
upon testing some of the assumptions underlying 
QALYs and their possible monetisation, rather 
than accepting them as uncontested. So instead of 
asking people to value (chances of) QALY gains/ 
losses directly, we adopted the strategy of asking 
people to value avoidance of, or reductions in the 
risk of, illness states described quite naturalistically; 
and we then tried to elicit in a standard way some 
QoL index measure of those states. Putting the 
two together would – if certain assumptions hold 
– enable us to assign money values to QALYs; 
but separating the two tasks would also allow us 
to examine more closely whether the necessary 
assumptions do in fact hold. 
 
To be more specific, the questionnaire centred 
around two illness states – one involving recurrent 
stomach/bowel problems, the other involving 
recurrent episodes of head pain. For each state, 
there were three possible durations: 3 months, 
12 months and ‘the rest of your life’. And for 
various combinations of these, there were questions 
about how much the respondent would be willing 
to pay to prevent the certainty of the illness and 
how much they would be willing to pay to eliminate 
some risk of the illness. Having obtained these 
monetary responses, the questionnaire went on to 
elicit information about trade-offs the respondent 
would make in terms of the relative probabilities 
of different health states, including some measure 
of the QoL index assigned to the illness state. In 
theory, this trade-off information makes it possible 
to compute for each individual the QALY losses 
entailed by the various illness descriptions; and 
this information, combined with the individual’s 
WTP to avoid/reduce the risk of the various illness 
scenarios, should (if the underlying assumptions 
hold) enable us to take readings of that individual’s 





The questionnaire can be viewed as divided into 
four sections. Part A asked questions about each 
individual’s current self-assessed state of health 
and then introduced them to the particular 
illness descriptions that constituted the focus 
of subsequent questions. Part B introduced 
the general idea of WTP for health benefits 
before eliciting a series of WTP values for 
different scenarios. These scenarios were varied 
between four different subsamples in order to 
provide broader coverage and allow certain 
tests of conformity (or otherwise) with standard 
assumptions. Respondents were allocated at 
random to one of the four subsamples, and the fact 
that Part A and the first question in Part B were 
common to all respondents allowed us to check for 
the comparability of those different subsamples. 
Part C consisted of four questions eliciting various 
risk trade-offs designed both to test the standard 
assumptions invoked for this part of the QALY 
computation and to provide a QoL/health- 
state index measure for the illness state under 
consideration. The final part of the questionnaire 
consisted of a series of questions collecting 
socioeconomic/demographic information. This 
allowed further checks of comparability between 
subsamples. 
 
Implementation and results 
There were four versions of the questionnaire, one 
for each of the four subsamples. A copy of Version 
2, together with the relevant supporting material, 
is included in Appendix 6. The ways in which 
the other versions differed from Version 2 will be 
explained in the text that follows. 
 
But first, the sample. In order to make the most 
of the project budget, sampling for this part of 
the project involved revisiting many of those who 
had previously participated in the ‘relativities’ 
part of the study and then enlarging the sample 
opportunistically from that base. Thus, this was 
a ‘convenience’ sample; and while it covered the 
full range of educational level, income and social 
class, it was not intended to be representative of 
the population as a whole. What is important 
for present purposes is that within this sample, 
respondents were allocated at random between the 
four versions of the questionnaire: our objective 
was to examine within-subject consistency and 
make between-subsample comparisons. If it is 
judged that the survey instruments pass the tests 
conducted on this basis, it will require a larger and 
more representative sample to provide estimates 








The four versions were as follows. Versions 1 and 
2 focused on scenarios about stomach illness while 
Versions 3 and 4 were centred on scenarios about 
head pain. As indicated earlier, within each version 
there were three durations of illness: 3 months 
followed by return to respondent’s current state 
of health; 12 months followed by return to 
respondent’s current state of health; and a chronic 
condition where the illness lasted for the rest of the 
respondent’s life. Each scenario was described on a 
separate card: the six cards are reproduced as part 
of the supporting materials in Appendix 7. 
 
The key way in which Version 1 differed from 
Version 2, and likewise the way in which Version 3 
differed from Version 4, related to the questions 
involving the risk of an illness: Versions 1 and 3 
asked about WTP to eliminate 10% risks of the 
three durations of illness, while Versions 2 and 4 
asked about eliminating 5% risks. 
 
The total number of questionnaires was 409. 
However, after a check, six of these were excluded 
on the grounds that they contained very few 
answers to the main questions and offered little  
or no possibility of contributing usefully to the 
analysis. 
 
The distribution of the 403 between the four 
versions is shown Table 26. 
 
 
TABLE 26 The distribution of versions 
 
We now turn to the main results from the key parts 
of the questionnaire, starting with Part A. 
 
Part A: current health 
status and ranking of illness 
descriptions 
At the beginning of the questionnaire, respondents 
were asked to complete a modified (actually, 
expanded) form of EuroQol 5 dimensions (EQ- 
5D) (five levels for each dimension rather than the 
usual three levels) – we shall refer to our version as 
EQ-5D+. Then they were asked to rate their own 
health on a visual analogue ‘thermometer’ scale, 
where 100 was labelled ‘as good as it could be for 
someone of your age’ and 0 was ‘as bad as being 
dead’. 
 
These questions were included more for purposes 
of ‘warming up’ respondents – getting them to 
think about what we mean by health, and giving 
them some tasks which involved them from the 
outset. They also allow us to check that there 
were no obvious health disparities between the 
respondents across the four versions – and indeed 
there were no significant differences between 
the distributions of responses to these questions 
across the subsamples. (Additional checks on the 
distributions of age and gender also showed no 
significant differences between the four subsamples 
in those respects.) 
 
Table 27 gives an overall summary of the responses 
to the EQ-5D+ questions. 
 
To check whether there was broad correspondence 
between EQ-5D+ responses and the VAS, we 
grouped EQ-5D+ responses into four categories 
by adding up the rank on each dimension. So 
someone who reported themselves as problem free, 
i.e. as 11111, got a sum score of 5. Someone who 
reported just one 2 got a score of 6. Someone who 
 
 
TABLE 27 The distribution of answers for current state of health 
Version Illness % Total 
1 Stomach pain; chance 10% 26 105 
2 Stomach pain; chance 5% 27 108 
3 Head pain; chance 10% 25 99 
4 Head pain; chance 5% 23 91 












Mobility 309 (77%) 45 (11%) 23 (6%) 21 (5%) 5 (1%) 
Self-care 376 (93%) 14 (3%) 7 (2%) 4 (1%) 2 (0.5%) 
Usual activities 317 (79%) 44 (11%) 20 (5%) 18 (4%) 4 (1%) 
Pain and 204 (51%) 125 (31%) 35 (9%) 32 (8%) 7 (2%) 
discomfort      
Anxiety and 300 (75%) 76 (19%) 16 (4%) 8 (2%) 2 (1%) 
depression      
 








reported themselves as 21232 was scored as 10; 
and so on. Table 28 gives the main VAS statistics for 
each of four EQ-5D+ categories. 
 
Comparisons across the groups using parametric 
and non-parametric tests [analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and Kruskal–Wallis] reject the null 
hypothesis in favour of the alternative that there 
are significant differences: that is, VAS scores are 
correlated with EQ-5D+ responses and VAS scores 
are as we should expect. In addition, both appear 
to correlate with age – the older people are, the 
worse their self-reported health. 
 
The questionnaire next asked each respondent 
to consider the various illness descriptions 
reproduced in Appendix 7 – 3 months of stomach 
illness, 12 months of stomach illness, the stomach 
illness for the rest of life, 3 months of head pain 
episodes, 12 months of head pain episodes, the 
head pain episodes for the rest of life, and sudden 
painless death – and to rank these seven scenarios 
from least bad down to worst. The main point 
of this exercise was to introduce people to the 
descriptions and to give them a task intended to 
get them to read them fairly carefully. 
 
Piloting had shown that it was quite demanding 
simply to give these seven cards to respondents and 
ask them to rank them. So the actual procedure 
involved giving them four cards to start with – 
the 3-month and 12-month  durations  of  both 
the stomach and the head pain symptoms – and 
ask them first to rank those. Once these had  
been ranked, each respondent was given the two 
‘lifetime’ durations and was asked to add those to 
the ranking. Finally, they were asked to locate the 
‘sudden painless death’ card by putting it above 
any of the other descriptions the respondent 
considered worse than death, or by putting it 
at the bottom of the ranking if the respondent 
considered death to be worse than all of the six 
illness scenarios. 
 
There is no single obviously ‘right’ ranking over 
all seven cards, but at the very least we might 
expect that within ‘stomach’ and within ‘head’ we 
should find the lifetime duration to be ranked 
worst and the 3-month duration to be ranked least 
bad. However, 21% of respondents failed to satisfy 
that expectation for at least one body area. This is 
arguably rather disappointing. 
 
Subsequent analysis shows that the ‘aberrant’ 21% 
did not give systematically different answers to the 
sets of questions that followed. Our conjecture is 
that although there was evidence of some confusion 
when asked to process these descriptions on first 
presentation, the later questions, which focused on 
subsets of no more than three at a time, did not 
pose the same difficulties. Still, one clear message 
is that if a large-scale representative survey were 
to be undertaken in the future, and if this were to 
involve a significant ranking task (especially near 
the beginning), extra time and care should be given 
to allow respondents to process the task. However, 
in the present feasibility study, the ranking exercise 
was intended mainly as a warm-up/familiarisation 
task, and respondents’ particular rankings play no 
role in the subsequent analysis. 
 
Part B: willingness-to-pay 
questions 
Having completed the illness ranking exercise, 
respondents were introduced to the idea of 
WTP to prevent/reduce illness with a ‘practice’ 
question, common to all versions. This question 
asked about WTP to reduce the duration of a 
sore throat while on holiday from 3 days to 1 day. 
The overall mean WTP was just over £40, with a 
median of £20. There were no differences between 
the distributions of responses across the four 
subsamples – again, some reassurance that the 
assignment of respondents to version was such as to 




TABLE 28 Main statistics for VAS values between EQ-5D groups 
Sum of ranks = 5 
(11111) 
 
Sum of ranks = 6 
 
Sum of ranks = 7/8/9 
Sum of 
ranks = 10+ 
n 169 87 86 61 
Mean 90.3 83.9 79.67 63.42 
Median 94 85 80 70 









Respondents then embarked on a series of five 
WTP questions. These are labelled B4, B5, B6, B7 
and B8 in the questionnaire, and this report will 
stick with those labels. B4 asked respondents what 
they would pay for ‘a simple, safe and painless cure 
that would avoid’ the (otherwise) certainty of the 
3-month illness (stomach in Versions 1 and 2, head 
in Versions 3 and 4); B5 asked for WTP to avoid 
the certainty of the 12-month illness; B6 asked for 
WTP to eliminate either a 10% (Versions 1 and 
3) or a 5% (Versions 2 and 4) risk of the 3-month 
illness; B7 asked the same for the 12-month illness; 
and B8 asked for WTP to eliminate the 10%/5% 
risk of the respondent suffering the illness for the 
rest of their life. 
 
The precise wording of these questions can be 
seen in the copy of Version 2 in Appendix 6. The 
essential features were as follows. First, respondents 
were asked to suppose that their income would 
be unaffected and to focus just on how the illness 
would affect their health, with health being 
explicitly framed with reference to the EQ-5D+ 
dimensions they had considered in the first 
question in Part A. 
 
In each of both B4 and B5, respondents were first 
asked whether avoiding the health effects of the 
illness would be worth at least something, even if 
it were only a few pence. If they responded that 
it would not even be worth paying a few pence, 
they were asked to say why they felt that way, 
and their response was noted by the interviewer. 
However – and especially for B4 and B5 (the 
questions expressed in terms of certainty) – the 
overwhelming majority said that they were willing 
to pay something. These respondents were then 
given a small pack of cards, each of which had 
a different sum of money printed on it. (The 
amounts were: £1, £5, £25, £50, £100, £250, £500, 
£1000, £2000, £3000, £5000, £10,000, £20,000, 
£50,000, £100,000 and £1M.) Once the pack had 
been shuffled, they were asked to sort the cards into 
(up to) three piles: those amounts they definitely 
would pay for an instant cure that would avoid all 
aspects of the illness; those amounts they definitely 
would not be prepared to pay; and any amounts 
about which they were unsure (initially, at least) 
whether or not they would pay. 
 
After initially sorting all of the money amounts, 
they were asked to think about any amounts they 
had placed in the ‘unsure’ pile and were invited 
to relocate them (if they wished – although there 
was no pressure to do so) into either of the other 
 
two piles. The interviewer then recorded the 
highest amount in the ‘definitely would pay’ pile 
and the lowest amount in the ‘definitely would 
not pay’ pile, reminded the respondent of the 
highest amount in the ‘definitely would pay’ pile 
and offered them the opportunity to nominate any 
higher amount they felt they would be prepared 
to pay. If the respondent did nominate a higher 
amount, that amount was recorded and was used  
in the subsequent analysis; if the respondent did 
not nominate a higher amount, the largest amount 
in the ‘definitely would pay’ pile was used in the 
analysis. 
 
Exactly the same procedure – and as far as 
possible, the same wording – was used for B6, B7 
and B8: the only substantive difference was that 
respondents were now being asked to suppose that 
a test had shown there was a 5% (alternatively, 10%) 
chance of developing the illness in question and 
were asked for their WTP to eliminate that risk. 
 
Avoiding/preventing the certainty 
of illness 
It should be noted that for questions B4 (3-month 
certainty) and B5 (12-month certainty), there  
were very few people giving zero responses. For 
the 12-month stomach (S) condition in B5, there 
were only two, while only seven others gave a 
WTP below £25; for head pain (H), the figures 
were one zero response and four others below 
£25. This contrasts with many WTP surveys where 
there is often a significant proportion of ‘protest’ 
zero responses given by people who feel that the 
good in question ought to be provided without 
specific charge and/or that money values are 
inappropriate. In this sample there appeared to be 
no such reaction to the avoidance of an otherwise 
certain illness: on the contrary, there was general 
recognition that the benefits offered in B4 and 
B5 were significant, and there was a widespread 
preparedness to indicate that with positive WTP 
responses. 
 
Besides establishing whether there was or was not 
some general willingness to state a monetary value 
to avoid certain illnesses, questions B4 and B5 were 
included for two other reasons. 
 
The first objective was to see whether spending 
some period(s) in one  health  state  was  regarded 
as significantly worse than spending the same 
period(s) in the other health state, as reflected by 
some significant difference between WTP to avoid  
a given duration in each state. (The intention was 








to compare this judgement with the health-state 
indices elicited via later questions.) 
 
The second objective was to examine the 
relationship between WTP and the duration of the 
illness. 
 
For  this latter purpose, the head pain cases are 
the most clear-cut. As can be seen from the illness 
description cards V and A in Appendix 7, the only 
difference between the two is the duration: V lasts 
for 3 months and A lasts for 12 months. But how 
might this difference be reflected in WTP amounts? 
 
There are various possibilities, not all working 
in the same direction. First, even though the 
periods of time are relatively short and reasonably 
close to the present, it might be that the future is 
discounted, so that the second, third and fourth   
lots of 3 months that constitute the last 9 months of 
the 12-month period are each given progressively 
lower weights, with the result that experiencing the 
health state for 12 months is regarded as less than 
four times as bad as experiencing it for 3 months. 
Moreover, there are ‘adaptation’ arguments that 
suggest that people may get used to being ill and 
adapt their behaviour accordingly, so that the 
loss of welfare after adaptation is less than it is 
initially – with the result that the welfare loss over 
12 months is less than four times the loss over 
3 months. 
 
In addition, and working in the same direction, it 
may be that paying four times as much represents 
more than four times the ‘sacrifice’ as financial 
budget limitations bite increasingly hard – with the 
result that WTP to avoid the 12-month illness is 
substantially less than WTP to avoid the 3-month 
illness. 
 
Against that, there is the possibility that a longer 
period of illness becomes increasingly difficult 
to accommodate and/or tolerate. Two somewhat 
different things might be at work here. First, there 
may simply be a sense of being ground down by 
continuing ill health. Second, while it may be 
possible to rearrange one’s life and work to some 
extent to cope with shorter periods of illness – 
putting off a holiday, for example, or postponing 
some tasks for a while – it may be increasingly 
difficult to work around a longer period of illness. 
 
It was not obvious a priori which tendencies would 
be predominant, and it was not intended that this 
study design would be able to unscramble all of 
the various forces and factors. The more limited 
 
aims were these: first, to see whether the pattern of 
money values corresponds with the simplest QALY 
model, where QALY losses are supposed to be 
strictly proportional to the time spent in an illness 
state, or whether there is some other pattern; 
and second, whether the pattern of money values 
corresponds with the trade-offs made in Part C. 
 
The same aims apply to the stomach illness 
scenarios. These were slightly more complex: 
although the recurrent bouts of stomach discomfort 
and sickness were of the same intensity and 
frequency for both the 3-month and the 12-month 
scenarios (and in that respect the latter might be 
regarded as four times the former), they began 
with illnesses of different severities, i.e. 3–4 days of 
stomach pains, diarrhoea and vomiting at the start 
of the 3-month illness compared with 7 days of 
severe stomach pains, diarrhoea, vomiting and fever 
at the beginning of the 12-month illness. However, 
even if the latter cannot be known to represent 
exactly four times as much loss of well-being as 
the former, we should still expect to see clear 
differentiation between the two, and the money 
values and Part C trade-offs can still be compared. 
 
We shall come to those Part C trade-offs later. But 
first, we consider the issue of whether the stomach 
condition (S) generated significantly different WTP 
responses than the head pain  condition  (H).  Table 
29 gives the summary statistics. 
 
The presence of outliers increases standard errors 
and makes it more difficult to reject via t-tests the 
nulls of equal means between S and H, although 
these nulls are just rejected at the 5% level 
(2-tailed) for both 3 months and 12 months. The 
non-parametric (Mann–Whitney) tests reject the 
null (easily) at the 1% level in both cases. On this 
evidence, members of our sample seemed to regard 
the H state as worse than the S state. 
 
What about sensitivity to duration? The 12-month 
to 3-month ratio of means is 2.305:1 for S and 
2.174:1 for H – both well short of the 4:1 ratio 
of duration. The ratios of medians are closer, 
i.e. 3.33:1 for S and 4:1 for H. So there is some 
sensitivity, but it is as if there is either some 
discounting of the longer duration or some effect 
of budget constraints (or some combination of 
both). 
 
If we take the difference between the B5 and B4 
responses for each individual, we find a similar 
overall pattern for both S and H. For S, 11 go 







TABLE 29 Summary statistics for B4 and B5 
 
3 months 12 months 
  
Stomach Head Stomach Head 
n Valid 212 189 213 190 
 Missing 1 1 0 0 
Mean WTP (£)  810.27 1495.88 1867.37 3252.35 
Median WTP (£)  150.00 250.00 500.00 1000.00 
Standard deviation  1856.70 4658.29 4769.52 8254.29 
 
 
3 months than 12 months), 45 give exactly the 
same answer to both questions (i.e. difference = 0), 
and 156 give a higher WTP to prevent 12 months. 
For H, the corresponding breakdown is 10:32: 
147. Were we to focus exclusively on the 303 
people who gave a strictly higher response to 
B5 than to B4, the ratio of means for S would be 
2235.83:687.21 which is 3.25:1, and for H the 
ratio would be 3870.44:1086.78, i.e. 3.56:1. Thus, 
even taking the subset of responses which satisfy 
the (minimum) requirement that the respondent 
places a strictly higher value on the avoidance of 
the 12-month illness than on the avoidance of 
the 3-month illness, the means still suggest a less- 
than-proportional relationship between WTP and 
duration. 
 
With such relatively short durations as 3 and 
12 months, it might seem implausible that there 
is substantial discounting on time preference 
grounds alone – in which case, the prime suspect 
might be the impact of budget constraints. If this 
were the main cause, we might expect the effect 
to be reduced by moving away from certainty and 
asking questions about reducing risks of adverse 
outcomes. This brings us to questions B6, B7 and 
B8. 
 
Eliminating the risk of illness 
Tables 30–32 report the key statistics for the 
questions which asked respondents for their WTP 
to eliminate either a 10% risk or a 5% risk of 
suffering the specified illness (B6 = 3-month risk, 
B7 = 12-month risk and B8 = lifelong risk). 
 
The first issue is whether responses were sensitive 
to the size of risk reduction. If such questions 
are to provide a sound basis for public policy, we 
should ideally like to see the values for eliminating 
the 10% risks being close to double the values for 
eliminating the corresponding 5% risks; and at  
the very least, we should expect the former to be 
significantly higher than the latter. 
However, Tables 30–32 show that there was very 
limited sensitivity to the size of the risk being 
eliminated. Out of the six 10% versus 5% between- 
sample comparisons – three for S and three 
for H – none of the t-tests showed a statistically 
significant difference between means. Indeed, and 
rather worryingly, the mean values for eliminating 
the 5% risk of H were in fact all higher than the 
corresponding means for eliminating the 10% risk. 
To some extent, this can be explained in terms of 
a couple of high outliers in the 5% H subsample 
(note the much larger standard deviations). 
However, there are other worrying signs – not 
least that the medians for the H subsamples, in 
particular, show insufficient sensitivity (and in 
B8, actually go the wrong way); and out of the six 
relevant Mann–Whitney tests, only one, for the 
12-month stomach illness, showed a difference that 
was statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
We can also compare on a within-subject basis the 
difference between what a respondent said they 
were willing to pay to prevent the certainty of an 
illness and what they said they were willing to pay 
to eliminate a 10% or 5% risk of the same illness. 
Generally, about 80% of the sample were willing 
to pay strictly more to prevent the certainty than 
to eliminate the risk, which would seem to be a 
minimum requirement. However, that still leaves 
about 12% who gave the same WTP, and about 8% 
who said they were willing to pay more to eliminate 
the risk than to prevent the certainty. 
 
What about within-subject sensitivity to duration, 
given the baseline risk? For each of the four 
versions, we can examine at the individual level the 
difference between the B8 (lifelong) response and 
the B7 (12-month) response, and also between the 
B7 and B6 (3-month) responses. 
 
Running t-tests of whether these differences are 
significantly greater than zero gives a clear picture 
for the B8 versus B7 differences – all reject the 

















n 104 106 98 90 
Mean WTP (£) 375.83 230.44 403.36 477.34 
Median WTP (£) 25.00 25.00 50.00 50.00 
Standard deviation 1133.79 1030.80 1283.01 2221.59 
 










n 105 106 99 90 
Mean WTP (£) 914.44 451.70 623.87 877.29 
Median WTP (£) 100.00 50.00 150.00 100.00 
Standard deviation 3364.82 1666.58 1460.66 2337.15 
 












n 104 108 98 86 86 
Mean WTP (£) 3235.39 1883.42 3008.94 14,249.64 3203.13 
Median WTP (£) 325.00 250.00 600.00 750.00 750.00 
Standard deviation 9565.18 4145.36 6471.16 107,630.34 6637.52 
a Replaces one observation of £1M with £50,000. 
 
 
null at the 1% level. However, the means and 
medians for B8 are mostly only three to five times 
the values for B7, whereas average remaining 
life expectancy is much more than 3–5 years: the 
mean and median ages of the sample were 51.37 
and 52 respectively, so that average remaining life 
expectancy would be in the region of 30 years. 
 
The differences are predominantly in the right 
direction for the B7 versus B6 comparison, but 
here there are many more zero differences – 160 
across the sample as a whole, many but not all the 
result of zero WTP to eliminate these risks – so 
the null is not rejected for Version 4 and is on 
the borderline for Version 1. The ratios of the 
means are 2.43:1, 1.96:1, 1.55:1 and 1.84:1 for 
the four versions – all well short of the 4:1 ratio of 
duration, and overall lower than the corresponding 
ratios for B4 and B5, despite the fact that budget 
considerations might have been expected to have 
exerted greater constraints on the B5:B4 ratios. 
The ratios of medians are somewhat higher, at 4:1, 
2:1, 3:1 and 2:1, but mostly still fall short of the 
ratio of duration and are also more muted than in 
the B5:B4 comparisons. This may suggest that it is 
not simply an issue of budget constraints but that 
the use of probabilities introduces further ‘noise’ 
and diminished sensitivity into people’s patterns of 
response. 
 
A possible side effect of the reduced sensitivity 
to questions involving these risks was that the 
difference between S and H appeared to be 
somewhat attenuated. There are three comparisons 
for the 10% baseline, and another three for the 
5% baseline: none of the six t-tests showed a 








the Mann–Whitney tests came close (p = 0.056 in 
the case of the 5% risk of the 3-month illness). 
 
Thus, despite the theoretical advantages of using 
risk reduction questions to elicit values, the 
evidence from this feasibility study seems to suggest 
that those questions do not, in practice, show the 
kind of sensitivity, either to the size of the risk 
reduction or to the duration of the illness, that 
would be desirable as a basis for a robust value of a 
QALY. 
 
If probabilities seem to pose additional problems 
for WTP questions, what are the implications for 
questions that use probabilities to express trade- 
offs between health states and durations? The study 
explored this issue in Part C of the questionnaire,  
to which we now turn. 
 
Part C: standard gamble 
questions 
There were four questions in this part of the 
questionnaire. The basic structure was the same for 
all four. In each case, respondents were asked to 
consider two alternatives. On the left of a showcard 
(see the supplementary material in Appendix 
8) was displayed some prospect that would be 
faced with certainty – for example, in the first of 
these questions, that prospect was the certainty 
of 3 months of either S or H. On the right of   
the showcard was an uncertain prospect with two 
possible outcomes: the good outcome, which was 
in all cases the respondent’s current health, with 
no ill effects; and the bad outcome, which varied 
from one question to another, but which was always 
worse than the certain prospect on the left – for 
example, in the first of these questions it was 
12 months of either S or H. 
 
So the uncertain alternative offered some chance 
of being in a better state than the certain prospect, 
but also entailed some chance of being worse off. 
What each respondent was asked to identify were 
the probabilities of being better or worse off that 
would make them feel that there was nothing to 
choose between the two alternatives. In all four 
questions, these probabilities were elicited by an 
iterative process. The full details can be found in 
the body of the questionnaire in Appendix 6, but 
the essential idea was as follows. 
 
Initially, the respondent was asked to choose 
between the certain prospect (of 3 months in S, 
say) and a treatment whose outcome was uncertain 
 
but which offered a 90% chance of success (which 
meant continuing in current health, with no ill 
effects) and a 10% chance of failure (resulting in S 
lasting for 12 months rather than 3 months). The 
next stage of the question depended on the answer 
to that first choice. If they had preferred the certain 
prospect to the 90%:10% alternative, the chances 
were changed to make the uncertain alternative 
more attractive – this time offering a 99% chance 
of success alongside a 1% chance of failure – and 
the respondent was asked to choose afresh. On the 
other hand, if they had preferred the uncertain 
alternative, the chances were changed to 50%:50% 
to make that prospect less attractive, and the 
respondent was then asked to choose on this basis. 
 
By altering the chances on the right hand side in 
response to each choice, it was possible to home 
in on a pair of probabilities which balanced the 
two alternatives in terms of the respondent’s 
preferences. 
 
As indicated above, the first question of this kind 
– labelled C and administered in conjunction 
with the relevant showcard – involved balancing 
the certainty of a 3-month illness against a risky 
treatment offering instant recovery to current 
health if successful but suffering for 12 months if 
this treatment failed. 
 
The next question – labelled D in the questionnaire 
– involved the certainty of 12 months’ illness 
versus a risky treatment offering instant recovery to 
current health if successful but suffering for the rest 
of their lifetime if this treatment failed. 
 
Question E juxtaposed the certainty of the lifelong 
condition versus the prospect of current health if 
the uncertain treatment succeeded but (painless 
immediate) death if it failed. 
 
Finally, Question F was the ‘complement’ of D. 
That is, the certain prospect involved 1 year in 
current health, which would then be followed 
for sure by the rest of their life in either S or H; 
while the risky prospect offered current health if it 
succeeded, but if it failed it entailed S or H starting 
immediately (i.e. this meant losing the first year in 
current health). 
 
Question C was intended to explore the 
relationship between the subjective loss entailed 
by the 3-month illness compared with the loss of 
well-being associated with suffering the condition 
for four times as long. As no money is involved 








in these types of question, the focus is upon how 
much worse the 12-month duration is compared 
with the 3-month period of illness. If (as a simple 
QALY calculation supposes) the 12-month illness 
involves four times as much QALY loss as the 
3-month illness, a respondent behaving broadly 
according to the QALY model should feel that 
the two alternatives are evenly balanced when the 
risk of failure is 0.25: that is, the 0.75 chance of 
avoiding the 3 months of illness would be regarded 
as exactly balancing a 0.25 chance of suffering an 
extra 9 months. 
 
As Table 33 shows, a relatively small proportion 
(overall, about 15%) of each subsample gave that 
answer. The majority (about 60% overall) were 
willing to accept only a smaller risk. Neither 
parametric nor non-parametric tests suggest any 
difference between the distributions of responses 
for S and H. On average, the 12-month illness 
appears to be regarded as five or six times as bad 
as the 3-month duration; while the interpretation 
based on the medians is that most people regard  
the loss of well-being (or to use decision theoretic 
terminology, utility) from the 12-month illness as 
being between seven and 14 times the loss involved 
in a 3-month illness. 
 
If we took these ratios as a reliable reflection of 
individual attitudes to duration, it would suggest 
that considerations of the difficulty of adapting to 
anything more than a fairly short illness and/or the 
‘intolerability’ of continuing ill health outweigh 
any ‘time discounting’. These results contrast 
with the relativities suggested by the responses to 
B4 and B5, where the ratios of means were only 
slightly above 2:1 and the ratios of medians were 
between 3:1 and 4:1. So if the SG responses do 
reflect preferences, the implication is that budget 
constraint effects are really quite strong. However, 
an alternative possibility is that framing these 
questions in terms of ‘chances’ and requiring 
 
 
TABLE 33 The statistics for Standard gamble C 
 
respondents to think probabilistically and confront 
risk and uncertainty may prompt excessively 
cautious responses, exerting a downward influence 
on the chances of failure they would accept, and 
seeming to inflate the magnitude of the loss 
entailed by 12 months as compared with 3 months. 
As will be seen shortly, there is some evidence 
from this study which is consistent with this latter 
interpretation; but the evidence is decidedly mixed, 
as is shown by the next question. 
 
Question D involved risking the illness for the 
rest of their life in order to avoid the certainty of 
12 months of the illness. As the lifelong illness 
involves more years of health loss for those with 
the greatest remaining life expectancy, one might 
suppose that the acceptable risk of failure should 
be lower for younger people. Table 34 divides the 
full sample into three roughly equal age groups 
and then reports the mean and median risks of 
failure for each age group for both S and H. 
 
However, for the most part there are no statistically 
significant differences between age groups within S 
or within H, whether judged by t-test or by Mann– 
Whitney test. The only exception is the comparison 
between the middle and older age groups for S: but 
there, the difference is in the opposite direction to 
the expected one – that is, older respondents are 
willing to take less risk, even though they would 
suffer for fewer years. 
 
The lack of – or even, perverse – sensitivity of 
response to age is a discouraging result. But here, 
by contrast with Question C, the means appear 
to underweight the magnitude of loss: given that 
average remaining life expectancy is in the region 
 







Age  43 (n = 61) 0.101 0.055 
Age > 43 but < 59 (n = 66) 0.137 0.060 
Age  59 (n = 73) 0.084 0.025 
All S 0.108 0.055 
H 
  
Age  43 (n = 62) 0.117 0.045 
Age > 43 but < 59 (n = 56) 0.123 0.030 
Age  59 (n = 60) 0.150 0.050 
All H 0.129 0.035 
 
Stomach Head 
n 202 179 
Failure risk < 0.25 130 102 
Failure risk = 0.25 29 28 
Failure risk > 0.25 43 49 
Mean 0.177 0.207 
Median 0.075 0.15 









of 30 years, overall means of 0.108 (for S) and 
0.129 (for H) imply that suffering the conditions 
for the rest of life would only be between 8 and 10 
times as bad as suffering for 1 year – a result that 
seems implausible unless we assume respondents 
to be discounting the future very heavily and/or to 
be anticipating considerable adaptation. Another 
possibility is that the arithmetic mean is not a 
particularly good measure of central tendency 
in these cases: the medians of 0.055 and 0.035 
– implying that the lifetime illness is between 18 
and 28 times as bad as the 12-month illness – 
may constitute a better reflection of the ‘typical’ 
respondent. 
 
Before considering Question E, it may be useful to 
look at the results from Question F. As mentioned 
above, Question F is the ‘complement’ of Question 
D. For both questions, the possible outcomes of the 
risky treatment are either to continue in current 
health or else to suffer lifelong illness from now on. 
In Question D, the certainty is 12-months’ illness 
followed by a return to current health for the rest  
of life, so that the possible gain from the risky 
treatment is to avoid the illness for the coming 
year, while the possible loss is to drop from current 
health for the rest of life after this year to illness for 
that remaining lifetime. 
 
In Question F, the certainty is that the respondent 
will remain in current health this year, but the  
onset of illness cannot be delayed beyond that and 
so the respondent will then be ill for the rest of 
their life. Thus, the potential gain from the risky 
treatment would be to avoid illness for all life after 
next year and instead spend those years in the 
health currently expected (i.e. the mirror image of 
the potential loss in Question D), while the possible 
loss in Question F is that instead of spending the 
next year in current health, the effects of the illness 
start now (i.e. the mirror image of the potential 
gain in Question D). On standard assumptions, 
whatever chance of failure makes the respondent 
feel that the alternatives are finely balanced in 
 
Question D should be the chance of success that 
would make things finely balanced in Question F. 
Put another way, for each respondent the sum of 
the two risks of failure should come to 1. Table 35 
reports the vital statistics for Question F and for 
the D + F sums. 
 
The null hypothesis that D + F = 1 is rejected at the 
0.1% level for both S and H. To give some rough 
idea of the distributions, consider Table 36, where 
the observations are grouped in four ranges. 
 
It is not clear exactly what this result signifies. If 
a similar exercise has been conducted in previous 
work, we are not aware of it; and so interpretation 
must be cautious and speculative. However, one 
possible interpretation is that many people are 
averse to the possible bad outcome of a risky 
prospect but do not know exactly how averse they 
are, and therefore in one or both questions they 
respond with extra caution, thus producing at 
least one and possibly two understatements of the 
downside risk they would accept. 
 
While this might fit with the tentative suggestion 
that respondents exhibited excessive caution 
in Question C, it does not fit so neatly with the 
responses in Question D, which might be seen as 
reflecting a propensity by a significant proportion 
of the sample to take too much risk when the 
downside involves suffering the illness for the rest 
of their life. 
 
On the other hand, it does seem likely that the 
risks people were willing to take in Question F 
were very conservative. An ‘average’ respondent 
with 30 years’ remaining life expectancy is facing, 
on the left-hand side, the certainty of spending 
the last 29 of those years in either S or H; but 
the uncertain treatment on the right-hand side 
offers some chance of avoiding that and instead 
spending all of the rest of their life in the health 
they currently expect – the downside risk being 
that if the uncertain treatment fails they lose 
 









D + F 
n 202 195 180 172 
Mean 0.474 0.583 0.520 0.653 
Median 0.550 0.575 0.550 0.676 



















the coming year of current health. The median 
response – wanting a 45% chance of avoiding the 
chronic illness in order to be prepared to take a 
55% chance of suffering the illness immediately 
– appears at first pass either to place a very high 
value on the next year relative to the rest of life 
(not reflected in their Question D responses) or to 
reflect misunderstanding/confusion. In any event, 
it may prompt us to treat with caution other data 
emerging from SG questions. 
 
This brings us to Question E, which is a vital 
component in any attempt to infer a monetary 
value of a QALY from the present survey. 
 
The idea of Question E was to get each individual’s 
assessment of the health state (S or H) in the form 
of a ‘health-state index’ number. The underlying 
assumption here is that current health is indexed   
at 1 and death at 0 and that an individual’s index 
number for either S or H is independent of the 
number of years spent in that state relative to 
spending those years in current health or else  
being dead for that time. So the loss of health 
(relative to 1) is assumed to be revealed by the risk 
of death that would make the individual indifferent 
between the certainty of S/H for the rest of their 
life and the uncertain cure-or-kill treatment. The 
results for this are portrayed in Table 37. 
 
Although the mean for H was higher than for S, 
the medians were the same, and neither a t-test  
nor a Mann–Whitney test registered any significant 
difference. The picture here, then, is more similar 
to the one emerging from the risk reduction 
WTP questions B6–B8 than from the B4 and B5 
 
 
TABLE 37 The statistics for Standard gamble E 
questions asking about WTP to avoid the certainty 
of the illnesses, which suggested that H was 
regarded as significantly worse than S. 
 
Using the willingness-to-pay 
and standard gamble data 
to derive a monetary value 
of a QALY 
In order to get an estimate of each individual’s 
monetary value of a QALY, our procedure involves 
converting an illness description into a QALY loss 
by using the individual’s response to Question 
E, and then combining that with their money 
value for avoiding that loss, taken from the WTP 
questions. 
 
There are various ways we could combine 
individuals’ responses to different questions, but 
perhaps the simplest to explain is to take the 
12-month illness, compute the QALY loss involved 
in that, and combine that with WTP to avoid that 
loss as stated in response to B5. It will be seen that 
the issues raised by this route are so fundamental 
that it is really rather superfluous to pursue the 
other variants, none of which circumvent those 
fundamental problems. So we focus on this route, 
which works as follows. 
 
Consider someone who is just willing to accept a 
5% risk of death in Question E. This is taken to 
signify that the illness state is indexed at 0.95 on 
the scale that runs from 1 (normal health) to 0 
(dead, or as bad as being dead). In other words, 
each year spent in that state is rated at 0.95 of 
a normally healthy year and thus represents a  
loss of 0.05 (i.e. one-twentieth) of a QALY. If that 
same individual states in Question B5 that they 
are willing to pay £800 to avoid that loss, then 20 
people like this respondent would, collectively, be 
prepared to pay £16,000 to avoid health losses 
that add up to one QALY (i.e. 20  0.05). Thus, 
this individual’s responses amount to saying that 
for a population consisting of similar people, the 
money value of a QALY is judged to be £16,000. By 
calculating the ‘value of a QALY’ implied by each 
individual’s responses combined in this way, we can 
derive mean and median values for this sample. 
 
The potential problem, of course, is that if 
someone says they are only willing to take a 1 in 
100,000 risk (or less) of death in Question E, their 
WTP to avoid the 12-month illness is multiplied 
Stomach Head 
D + F  0.5 87 63 
0.5 < D + F < 0.9 60 51 
0.9  D + F  1.10 35 41 
D + F > 1.10 13 17 
 
Stomach Head 
n 196 177 
Mean 0.104 0.144 
Median 0.025 0.025 









by 100,000, potentially giving an astronomical 
figure for the value of a QALY. (Someone who says 
they are only willing to take a 1 in 100,000 risk of 
death to avoid the chronic illness state is taken to 
be indexing that health state at 0.99999, i.e. a year 
spent in that state is taken to amount to the loss of 
0.00001 of a QALY. So if 100,000 such people were 
each willing to pay, say, £300 to avoid the 12-month 
illness, they would between them be paying 
£30M and their combined benefit would add  
up to just one QALY.) Sure enough, we find that 
115 respondents in total – 59 in the S subsample 
and 56 in the H subsample – give responses to 
Questions E and to B5 which, in combination, 
imply values of a QALY of more than £1M. With 
some of these combinations generating values of 
thousands of millions of pounds, the mean values 
for a QALY are £3  108 from the S subsample 
and £7  108 from the H subsample. The medians 
are somewhat more terrestrial: £26,666.67 and 
£57,142.86 respectively. On the grounds that there 
are no statistically significant differences between 
the two subsample distributions, we might pool 
them to obtain an overall mean of £5  108 and an 
overall median of £40,000. 
 
It has been widely accepted that when such values 
are being used to guide public policy, it is the mean 
figure which should be used as the best indicator 
of social welfare. However, clearly, a mean value 
for a QALY of £5  108, or even a figure one- 
thousandth as big as that (i.e. £500,000), would 
be totally anomalous in a world where the VPF is 
about £1.5M and where this, in the context of road 
accident fatalities, represents preventing a death 
which on average entails the loss of about 40 years 
of life expectancy. 
 
Nevertheless, applying the procedure in the way 
described does generate the kinds of extremely 
skewed distributions reported, and that does 
produce means which are pulled up by some 
extremely high individual figures. 
 
This raises the question of whether there is 
something that could be done – some other way 
of managing the procedure or analysing the data, 
perhaps – that might give figures more compatible 
with those in use in other areas of public health 
and safety policy? 
 
As a start to answering this question, recall what is 
involved in a study to elicit the value of preventing  
a (statistical) fatality or the value of preventing a 
particular (statistical) injury. Typically, respondents 
 
are presented with a description of a specified 
physical outcome – death, or a particular injury 
description – and are asked for their WTP to 
reduce their risk of experiencing this outcome by 
some given amount. We then effectively sum the 
responses over a representative population big 
enough that their individual risk  reductions  add 
up to preventing the (statistical) expectation of one 
death or one injury of the particular type. 
 
In the course of this procedure, no attempt is made   
at the individual level to ascertain the number of 
QALYs each individual perceives they would lose in 
the event of being killed or  injured.  In  principle, 
this could be done. Were things to be done that way,  
it might very well be that the combination of some 
individuals giving high WTP with  responses  by 
them implying very small individual QALY scores 
would produce a similar highly-skewed distribution 
and upward pull on means. But as things stand, it   
has not been the usual practice. So, in the light of   
the way in which things actually have been done, 
what might be the implication  for  the  present 
study? 
 
Take  the case of a non-fatal road injury, which 
is a closer analogue than a fatality to the illness 
descriptions used in the present study. Call this 
road injury ‘J’. Typically, respondents have been 
given descriptions of what J involves, have been 
asked to think how such an injury would impact 
upon their life, and have then either been asked 
for their WTP to prevent/reduce the risk of such 
an injury or expressed some relativity between 
the injury and death. In this latter case, the value 
of preventing each J is then ‘pegged’ against the 
VPF according to the average relativity expressed 
between J and death. But however it is arrived at, 
for the sake of example, let us suppose that the 
process generates an average money value for 
preventing injury J of £60,000. 
 
If one were to want to go further and infer a value 
of a QALY from the established value of preventing 
injury J, the most obvious way of doing so would 
be to undertake a survey eliciting from a cross- 
section of the population their judgement of the 
QALY loss they would suffer if they sustained injury 
J. Again, for the sake of example, suppose that 
responses to such a survey ranged quite widely 
from one individual to another but that the average 
judged QALY loss turned out to be 2.5 QALYs. 
 
On this basis, a public body undertaking a road 








to prevent 10 cases of injury J could (just) 
justify that expenditure on cost–benefit grounds 
(assuming all other projects yielding an excess 
of benefit over cost were also undertaken). And 
although this body could not say in advance which 
particular individuals would benefit from the 
scheme by avoiding injuries they would otherwise 
have suffered, it could assert that on average the 
benefit would amount to preventing a loss of 25 
QALYs, translating to an average value of £24,000 
per QALY. 
 
We can mimic that kind of calculation on the basis 
of the data collected in the feasibility study if it is 
processed in the following way. 
 
First, we have reported in Table 29 the WTP-based 
mean values for avoiding the 12-month durations 
of S and H: respectively, £1867.37 and £3252.35. 
Let us round these figures to £1870 and £3250. 
Had our sample been a large, representative 
cross-section of the population, it could have 
been argued that health-care resources allocated 
to preventing/curing such illnesses could (just) 
be justified if they cost those amounts for every 
12-month episode prevented/cured. 
 
Then we might ask what QALY gains would result 
from such expenditure. We cannot know which 
particular individuals will benefit, but on the basis 
of our sample members’ responses to Question E as 
summarised in Table 37, together with the standard 
QALY procedure for combining health-state indices 
with periods of time spent in a health state, we 
could say that, on average, each avoided case of 
12-month S would avoid a loss of 0.104 of a QALY, 
while each avoided case of 12-month H would 
generate an average benefit of 0.144 of a QALY. 
 
Putting the relevant figures together, we would 
have an expenditure of £1870 on 12-month S, 
bringing an average QALY benefit of 0.104, which 
translates to a money value of about £17,980 
per QALY, while each £3250 spent preventing 
12-month H would ‘save’ 0.144 QALYs, implying a 
value per QALY of approximately £22,570. 
 
Processed this way, the data obtained via two 
different health-state descriptions produce figures 
reasonably close to each other on either side of 
£20,000 per QALY. But why are these figures so 
very different from the astronomical means based 
on the value-per-QALY figures generated by 
combining Question E and B5 responses at the 
level of each individual? And which – if either – is 
the correct basis for deriving an estimate? 
 
The answer to the first of these questions is fairly 
straightforward and can be illustrated by an 
example (which may also be helpful when trying to 
answer the second question). 
 
Consider a subsample of 10 people. In order to 
keep things simple, suppose each of them states 
the same WTP value to avoid 12 months of H – let 
us say £250 (which works out at about £10 for each 
fortnightly episode avoided). Suppose also that in 
response to Question E, 8 of these 10 would take 
a 1% risk of death in order to get a 99% chance 
of avoiding H for the rest of their lives, while one 
person would take a 2% risk and the remaining 
member of the subsample would only take a 0.1% 
chance. Averaging those responses gives an average 
QALY loss of 0.0101 per 12-month illness which, 
combined with the average WTP of £250 to avoid 
it, generates a value per QALY of just over £24,750. 
 
Contrast this with the figure given by first 
combining each individual’s WTP with their 
Question E response and then averaging. For 
eight respondents, the implied value of a QALY 
is £250 ÷ 0.01, which gives £25,000. For the 
respondent prepared to take a 2% risk, the figure 
is £250 ÷ 0.02, which gives £12,500. And for the 
respondent who will only accept a risk of 1 in 1000, 
the calculation is £250 ÷ 0.001, which produces 
£250,000. On this basis, the subsample mean is 
£46,250, i.e. almost double the figure arrived at by 
the other method. 
 
The reason for the difference is this. Under the 
first method of computation, the two responses 
which differed from 0.01 were added to each other 
and to the eight 0.01s; and as they diverged from 
0.01 in different directions but by almost the same 
amount, (+0.01 in one case, –0.009 in the other), 
this adding and averaging more or less cancelled 
them out, so that the subsample average diverged 
from 0.01 by just 0.0001. The net effect of this was 
to nudge the computed value of a QALY down to a 
little below £25,000. 
 
However, under the second computation method, 
the (reciprocals of the) probabilities operate 
multiplicatively on the WTP responses before any 
averaging occurs. Thus the difference between 0.01 
and 0.02 acts to halve the implied value of a QALY 
for that individual from £25,000 to £12,500 – a 
money difference of –£12,500. At the same time, 
the slightly smaller difference in the opposite 
direction between 0.01 and 0.001 acts to multiply 
by 10 the implied value – producing £250,000 








of +£225,000. When added and averaged at this 
stage, the two ‘outliers’ nowhere near cancel each 
other out: on the contrary, one individual’s implied 
value comes to more than all of the other nine put 
together, and this has the effect of almost doubling 
the mean. 
 
So that is why the two methods of computation 
produce very different results; and the divergences 
in the example, striking though they may be, are 
dwarfed by the divergences in the actual sample, 
where still smaller probabilities had the effect of 
multiplying WTP responses by tens and hundreds 
of thousands, and even by millions. 
 
So which is the correct method to use? In theory, 
if our analysis is based on the premise of each 
member of the population valuing the same QALY 
gain, it is the second method, i.e. the method 
used initially in the analysis of the survey data 
which generates stratospheric means. But, as 
with any theory, the validity and usefulness of the 
results depend crucially on the extent to which the 
underlying assumptions are valid. If we subscribe 
to the conventional precepts of welfare economics 
and if we could be confident that individuals 
have values and preferences which conform with 
standard assumptions and that their responses  
to our questions reveal those values with total 
accuracy and precision, the second method would 
be the appropriate one to use. In the light of the 
example which shows how one person’s value 
can outweigh the values of nine others, this may 
seem a surprising conclusion; but if all 10 really 
were reporting their true values accurately, and if 
the guiding principles entail giving each person 
and their values equal weight, then taking the 
mean of that distribution, however skewed, is the 
appropriate thing to do. 
 
But what if certain assumptions do not hold 
perfectly? In particular, what if people are not 
always able to report their values with total 
accuracy, but are liable to give responses which 
contain elements of ‘noise’, error and/or bias? We 
are still some way from having very good models 
of the noise, error, bias and imprecision in human 
judgement; but we know enough to appreciate 
(a) that such things exist and (b) that they may 
not always be neutral or ‘white’ in their effects. So 
although we cannot say categorically how to model 
these factors, let us consider how they might impact 
upon the results of the present feasibility study. 
 
Consider again the example set out a few 
paragraphs earlier. Suppose that all 10 respondents 
 
not only have the same ‘true’ WTP to avoid the 
illness, but also would have their QoL diminished 
by the illness to exactly the same degree – that 
is, by 1%. If they each reported their values and 
judgements with complete accuracy, we should 
infer a mean value of a QALY of £25,000. 
 
However, suppose that they do not all process 
probability judgements with unerring accuracy. 
To keep things simple, suppose that just two of 
them give erroneous responses – one reporting a 
willingness to accept a 2% risk, the other setting 
the ‘break-even’ risk of failure at 0.1%. Of course, 
this is only an illustration: we do not know enough 
about judgemental error to say exactly which and 
how many deviations from the underlying ‘true’ 
values are likely to occur. The point is, however, 
that if those two responses involve (seemingly 
small) errors, they can throw the estimates off 
in different ways and to very different degrees, 
depending on how they are processed. In the case 
of the first (and theoretically vulnerable) method  
of taking the arithmetic mean WTP separately 
from the arithmetic mean of the failure risks and 
then deriving a value of a QALY on the basis of the 
combination of these two means, the errors act to 
produce an estimate which is roughly £250 (and 
thus about 1%) below the true value; whereas in the 
case of the second (and theoretically preferable) 
method, the errors act multiplicatively before any 
averaging process occurs, and thereby produce an 
estimate which is £21,250 (and thus 85%) above the 
true value. 
 
No general claim is being made here about the 
relative performance of the two methods: this 
is just a simple and convenient, albeit stylised, 
example. But what we do know is that people 
generally find probabilities quite challenging 
to manipulate, and their responses are liable to 
deviate a good deal, and in ways we do not well 
understand, from what is assumed by standard 
decision theories. (Recall the evidence relating 
to the sums of responses to Questions D and F, 
as reported in Tables 35 and 36.) So a method of 
calculation which is especially liable to magnify 
‘errors’ by including them multiplicatively – and 
which we know in this case is liable to produce 
phenomenally large and implausible values – seems 
hard to justify as a basis for public policy. 
 
Unfortunately, there is no way of knowing with any 
great confidence whether any serious distortions 
occur as the result of using the other method 
outlined here. It may be, as in the example, that 
this method has a tendency to understate the 








‘true’ value. But equally, it is possible to produce 
examples where that is not the case; and even if it 
were the case in this study, we know too little about 
the nature of the imprecision/error in people’s 
responses to say by how much any estimates diverge 
from the ‘truth’. Perhaps the most that can be said  
is that this method, flawed though it may be, seems 
broadly compatible with the ways in which other 
values used by government departments have been 
derived; and to the extent that there is a desire to 
have a monetary value for a QALY established on a 
similar footing to the values used in DfT, DEFRA, 
etc., there appears to be some argument for this 




Speaking of caveats, it is important to reiterate 
that even if the data were unproblematic and  
the calculation of the monetary value of a QALY 
were straightforward, no value generated by this 
feasibility study could be regarded as a sound basis 
for policy because the sample used here was not 
representative of the population. The question 
is, then, whether the present study gives grounds 
for believing that (at least some of) the techniques 
explored here could be used in conjunction with  
a large and genuinely representative sample to 
produce a value robust enough to be used to guide 
policy, or whether the evidence suggests that no 
sufficiently robust value is likely (ever) to emerge. 
 
There were a number of encouraging features. 
Interviewers generally found that respondents were 
engaged and interested, and very few interviews 
were aborted or resulted in large numbers of 
missing values. And even though many people 
in the UK are still somewhat resistant to the 
idea of paying for health care over and above 
tax contributions, the very small number of zero 
responses to B4 and especially B5 suggests that the 
‘protest’ element was small and that people were 
willing to ‘play the game’. Moreover, although the 
responses to B4 and B5 did not display the ideal 
4:1 ratio that full sensitivity to duration might have 
elicited, there was a degree of sensitivity that could 
arguably have been compatible with the effect of 
budget constraints. 
 
However, there are also a number of discouraging 
features. Although by no means new or 
unexpected, there was serious between-sample 
insensitivity to the size of the risk being eliminated 
in questions B6–B8. And although responses to 
 
these questions should have been less affected 
by budget constraints and should therefore have 
shown greater sensitivity to duration, they did, 
if anything, exhibit rather less sensitivity to the 
3-month:12-month difference; and also seemed 
to greatly underweight the ‘remaining lifetime’ 
duration relative to the 12-month scenario, with 
mean responses to B8 never more than 5 times 
higher than the corresponding means for B7, even 
though average remaining life expectancy was in 
the region of 30 years. It appeared that the use 
of probabilistic questions added complexity and 
dulled sensitivity. 
 
Thus it may come as no surprise that some of 
the Part C questions, which used probabilities 
as their main ‘currency’, were also problematic. 
Although responses to Question D showed greater 
sensitivity to duration than was exhibited in the 
WTP questions, the mean response still appeared 
to greatly underweight remaining life expectancy 
relative to the next year. The summation of 
responses to Questions D and F showed a very 
substantial and seemingly systematic departure 
from the behaviour that would be consistent with 
standard assumptions. 
 
It is hard to say whether the responses to 
Question E are ‘reasonable’ or not. Certainly, the 
distributions are heavily skewed: for both S and H 
the measure of skewness is greater than 2. Between 
a quarter and a third of respondents gave a ‘failure 
risk’ greater than the mean, while more than a 
third were unwilling to accept a risk of failure of 
1 in 1000. Focusing on this latter statistic, does it 
really seem plausible that a condition involving 
significant disruption of at least some activities 
for between 8 hours and 3 days every couple of 
weeks entails a loss of welfare of less than 0.1%? 
Or is it that eliciting a response by means of a 
question involving the risk of immediate death 
induces ultraconservative responses from a 
significant minority of respondents? This is an 
open question. But if such responses are combined 
at the individual level with average WTP responses, 
they imply huge values of a QALY of the kind that 
generate the implausibly high means reported in 
this study. 
 
On the other hand, if we compute means for B5 
and for Question E separately and then use the 
ratio of these means to estimate the value of a 
QALY, the two figures obtained via different illness 









Overall, then, this feasibility study sounds many 
notes of caution and points to a number of issues 
– particularly concerning the way respondents 
process probabilities and the extent to which their 
answers are sensitive to key dimensions – that 
would require further investigation before investing 
in a large representative national survey. Such 
 
questions are potentially amenable to investigation 
using qualitative methods and entailing 
considerable cognitive testing during piloting, and 
it would be unwise to embark on a large-scale study 
to generate policy values without first undertaking 
extensive (and probably expensive) preparatory 









he main contributions of the research 
described in this report have been the 
development and initial application of two novel 
approaches to eliciting weights for QALYs along 
with one for estimating a monetary value of a 
QALY. 
 
Detailed caveats have been listed within each of 
the preceding three chapters and, so, only broad 




The main results of the discrete choice and 
matching approaches show very different sets of 
weights for age and severity. In broad terms, the 
discrete choice results might be taken as suggesting 
that it is not worth weighting QALYs at all. By 
contrast, significant weights can be inferred from 
matching data, with gains for some groups being 
weighted up to 2.75 times higher than for others 
when using the more conservative aggregation 
method, the ratios going up to 4:1 using the less 
conservative method. Despite such differences in 
magnitude, discrete choice and matching weights 
did show similar patterns across age (but not 
severity) ranges. 
 
There are two perspectives to take on the 
differences in results. First, it could be said that it 
would be premature to propose any particular set 
of QALY weights at this point in time: before that 
point is reached, there is scope for both further 
reconciliation and replication. Second, it might be 
argued that there is no scope for reconciliation and 
we need to choose between the results in light of 
the caveats of each. 
 
Reconciliation and replication 
With respect to the reconciliation of our findings it 
could, of course, be argued that it is not surprising 
that the discrete choice and matching methods 
led to different results. One factor has already 
been pointed out. The matching study involved 
holding health gains constant between the two 
options in any pairwise choice, and varying the 
age and severity attributes, while the discrete 
choice questions presented a pair of scenarios 
with different health gains as well as levels of 
age and severity. It might be, therefore, that the 
matching procedure highlights age and severity 
while the discrete choice method dampens down 
their impact when the size of health gain is also 
varied. Indeed, if respondents have lexicographic 
preferences, whereby health gain matters above 
all else, it could be argued that the results of the 
discrete choice and matching approaches are 
entirely consistent. If this were the case, then the 
policy implications would require very careful 
thinking through and would pose major challenges 
to matching-based approaches in which choices 
presented hold QALY gains constant. Nevertheless, 
continuing to focus on the differences, there are 
additional limitations in the design of the discrete 
choice study which indicate caution around 
interpretation of results. 
 
Other potentially important differences between 
the methods are listed in more detail in Appendix 
9. Despite these, given that each respondent was 
asked a set of discrete choice questions and a set of 
matching questions, further detailed analysis may 
shed light on reasons for the differences. 
 
Decision heuristics provides another possible 
avenue to reconciliation. First we have mentioned, 
in Chapter 5, that the lowest weight attached to the 
60- to 80-year-olds in full health may have resulted 
from respondents thinking that 80% health is good 
enough for someone in such an age group. The  
lack of graphical representation of numbers of 
people in the matching study may have detracted 
respondents from the ‘brutal’ nature of trade-offs 
between persons, which, if dealt with otherwise, 
may have led to smaller trade-offs. With respect to 
the discrete choice approach, the simplest decision 
heuristic would be to compare the size of the areas 
representing the health gain, i.e. to maximize 
health and ignore age and severity. If each of these 
arguments had some validity, the ‘true’ result would 
be somewhere between the two. 
 
It may be significant that the discrete choice and 
matching studies use different functional forms for 
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In the discrete choice study, utility is modelled 
as a function of ‘age at onset’ (AO), ‘age at death 
if untreated’ (AD), ‘quality of life lost without 
treatment’ (QL), and ‘QALYs gained from 
treatment’ (QALY). Thus, the discrete choice 
functional form measures the health gain from an 
intervention by the size of the dark shaded area in 
Figures 2 and 3, i.e. it measures the health gain as 
the total number of QALYs. The functional form 
then treats this measure of ‘total QALY gain’ as 
one variable. The other three variables describe 
the lifetime health profile without treatment (the 
light shaded area). So, the weights produced by the 
discrete choice study are based on the properties of 
the light shaded area and the total area of the dark 
shaded area. 
 
In contrast, the matching study focuses on the 
properties of the ‘dark shaded area’ of health gains. 
Recall that this study uses a ‘QALY grid’ of 20 cells, 
defined and numbered as in Figure 16. Each cell 
is assumed to have a subjective weight, which is 
applied to any health gains that occur in that cell. 
The subjective value of an intervention is modelled 
as the sum of the weighted health gains that are 
generated. 
 
For example, consider the following case. In the 
absence of treatment, the lifetime health profile 
is given by AO = 10, AD = 20 and QL = 0.7 (i.e. 
 
the patient is in full health to age 10, drops to 
30% health from ages 10 to 20, and then dies). 
With treatment, the patient is maintained at 50% 
health from age 10 to age 30, and then dies. The 
health profile without treatment is represented by 
the light shaded area in Figure 16; the health gain 
from treatment is represented by the dark shaded 
area. The discrete choice study treats the effect 
of treatment as an undifferentiated gain of seven 
QALYs (i.e. an increase of 20 percentage points for 
10 years, plus an increase of 50 percentage points 
for 10 years). The weight given to these QALYs 
is determined by the values of AO, AD and QL. 
In contrast, the matching study treats the effect 
of treatment as the creation of two QALYs in cell 
2, one QALY in cell 5, two QALYs in cell 6 and 
one QALY in each of cells 9 and 10; each of these 
QALYs is given the weight of the cell in which it is 
located. Denoting the weight of each cell i by w
i
, 
and the QALY gain in each cell i by q
i
, a simple 











It is possible that the difference between the 
functional forms used in the two studies is 
responsible for the differences in their results. 
We tried to test this explanation by estimating 
equation (6) using the discrete choice data. One 
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results of the two studies were primarily due to the 
different functional forms used, this estimation 
exercise would generate weights similar to those 
found in the matching study. Alternatively, if it 
generated weights with some other systematic 
pattern, that might point towards some other 
explanation of the differences. (For example, if  
the weights were approximately equal in all cells, 
that would give further support to the conclusion 
that, when answering to discrete choice questions, 
respondents do not weight QALYs according to 
age or severity.) In fact, the estimated weights were 
highly variable, with no apparent pattern. The 
Bayesian information criterion clearly favoured 
the original model (described in Chapter 4, 
Predicted probability of choice approach) rather 
than equation (6). The lack of structure in these 
estimates is probably the result of econometric 
problems caused by multicollinearity in the data. 
The basic problem is that, in a typical discrete 
choice question, the health gains created by each 
intervention occur in cells that are adjacent to 
one another, creating strong positive correlation 
between the q
i 
values for adjacent cells. This 
reflects the fact that the questions used in the 
discrete choice study had been designed to estimate 
a very different model. 
 
Procedurally, too, the exercises are very different 
(the results of the matching questions are derived 
from numbers being treated, which is always 
constant in the discrete choice) and discrete choice 
is perhaps a more complicated task (there are more 
things varying at any one moment, such as the 
health gain). Other such differences are outlined 
below. As pointed out in Chapter 1, these further 
differences represent concerns that each group 
within the Team, largely Newcastle-led and UEA- 
led, have with the piece of relativities work on 
which they did not lead. The Newcastle-led group 
think that both exercises have their merits, whereas 
the UEA-led group stands by the methods and 
results from the matching study. 
 
Replication is also important. Aspects of each of 
these approaches are new and their applications 
to deriving relative weights for QALYs have 
generated significant challenges. Further survey 
work is required to inform the debate on weighting 
of QALYs with more confidence. With respect to 
discrete choice methods, as we have said, we would 
recommend pursuit of alternative experimental 
design strategies in order to address the issue 
of implausible scenarios while still maintaining 
desirable design properties, so ensuring we can 
 




between the approaches 
It is possible, of course, to choose between the 
approaches in light of the caveats of each. Here, we 
outline those caveats without making such a choice. 
The discrete choice approach is new with respect to 
its application to deriving QALY relativities. This 
novelty could be viewed as advantageous. However, 
the approach raises some serious questions that 
would threaten the validity of the results. The main 
ones are: 
 
• The issues raised by a compromised design by 
standards usually applied to discrete choice 
experimentation and whether the more 
pragmatic econometric approach overcomes 
these to any degree. 
• The theoretical meaning that can be attached 
to the multiplicative functional form that 
underlies the analysis of the discrete choice 
data. More specifically, the meaning of 
multiplying QALYs by two age variables as 
well as by severity, and the challenges of 
multicollinearity such a model engenders. 
In defence of this model, however, it is not 
clear what form such a function should take 
and the use of squared and cubic terms might 
reasonably have been expected to pick up  
any non-linearities implied by the functional 
form arising from the matching data. Also, 
as pointed out in Chapter 4, although, it may 
appear that a multiplicative model of the form 
QALYs  AGE  SEVERITY, with just one age- 
related variable, would make more theoretical 
sense, we took the more pragmatic view that 
this would leave too much riding on the 
‘age at onset’ variable in terms of explaining 
what respondents might be thinking about 
in relation to age, and so we included age at 
death as well. In addition, this was the best 
performing model empirically, which, it could 
be argued, is important for estimating weights. 
• Whether the transformations of original 
variables to a QALY composite and QoL lost 
represent too much of a distortion from the 
variables as presented to respondents in the 
survey. 
• The challenges of coping with severity as 










The matching approach builds on a method used 
previously in the literature. The results are not 
out of line with such earlier studies, the pattern 
of weights being consistent across aggregation 
methods. Nevertheless, in addition to QALY gains 
being held constant in the matching questions, 
there are some issues with the matching that 
remain to be resolved. These are that: 
 
• There is an underlying assumption that 
numbers of beneficiaries presented in 
matching scenarios can be multiplied by the 
number of QALYs (implicitly) presented, and 
it is not clear if respondents were thinking in 
such a manner. 
• While the ‘whole column’ and ‘whole row’ 
tests looked at the issue of larger QALY gains, 
it is unclear whether we can generalise from 
weights obtained by offering four QALY gains 
to gains of fewer than four QALYs and it is 
acknowledged that many interventions yield a 
much smaller benefit than four QALYs. 
• Although a general pattern has been detected, 
the appropriate magnitude of the weights 
remains to be established. This is not a 
problem of the matching methodology per se, 
but rather an inevitable part of any elicitation 
exercise which is used to guide policy. 
 
In summary, the extent to which either approach 
yields results that are entirely consistent with social 
preferences is uncertain. This work has indicated 
some important patterns in the data. It could be 
argued that the old and the healthy should receive 
lower weights. The challenges are with the actual 
numbers to adopt and so further validation and 
testing would be required before implementation 
in policy. 
 
The feasibility of estimating 
a monetary value of  a 
QALY 
It was never the intention in the valuation study 
to produce a monetary value of a QALY for use in 
policy deliberations. The purpose was simply to 
assess the feasibility of estimating such a value. 
 
There is scope to use the current data set to further 
explore different ways of combining WTP and SG 
data to arrive at a value of a QALY, and to examine 
the sensitivity of results to different assumptions 
about noise in the data – and especially in the 
probability responses generated by the SG 
questions. Further consideration needs to be given 
 
to aggregation issues: for example, the weight to 
attach to means versus medians, and whether to 
use means of individual WTP/SG combinations or 
combinations of mean WTP and mean SG values. 
 
The feasibility study has demonstrated that there 
are considerable challenges involved in trying to 
elicit a robust monetary value of a QALY. However, 
the low number of protest responses demonstrates 
that respondents are comfortable with these types 
of question. Any future national sample survey 
should be preceded by further extensive qualitative 
research and cognitive testing to resolve the main 
questions identified in the present study. 
 
Implications for research 
and practice 
Implications for practice 
Given the methodological nature of the research 
reported, implications for practice are limited, but 
twofold: 
 
• On relativities, it could be said that it would 
be premature to propose any particular set of 
QALY weights at this point in time: before that 
point is reached, there is scope for both further 
reconciliation and replication. However, it 
might equally be argued that there is no scope 
for reconciliation and we need to choose 
between the results in light of the caveats of 
each. 
• On valuation, it was never the intention 
to conduct a representative survey using a 
definitive method. The main recommendation, 
therefore, is that any future national sample 
survey should be preceded by further extensive 
qualitative research and cognitive testing to 




The research recommendations arsing from the 
study are that: 
 
• The findings from the relativities study indicate 
that more work is required in the short term 
to reconcile the results obtained, although 
fundamental differences between the methods 
and results reported may challenge such 
reconciliation. 
• Longer term, and still with respect to 
relativities, further methodological research 








deficiencies of the methods (especially the 
particular discrete choice approach used in 
SVQ). 
• Building on the results of the innovative 
methods that have been devised in this study 
to derive relative weights, further replication 
of these results is required to address this 
important policy issue. 
• With respect to valuation, shorter-term work 
is required around the issues of aggregation, 
combining WTP and SG values and the 
appropriateness of different measures of 
central tendency. 
 
• Longer term, more qualitative and cognitive 
research is required around two valuation issues 
in particular: first, the problem of identifying 
health states to present to respondents which 
are ‘minor enough’ for people to be able 
to express their WTP but not so minor that 
respondents will accept only minuscule risks of 
death when responding to SG type questions; 
and, related to the first, the extent to which 
‘noise’ and ‘error’ in people’s responses might 
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